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I.   INTRODUCTION
K. must remember that the proceedings were not public; they
could certainly, if the Court considered it necessary, become
public, but the Law did not prescribe that they must be made
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public. Naturally, therefore, the legal records of the case . . . were
inaccessible to the accused and his counsel, consequently one
did not know in general, or at least did not know with any pre-
cision, what charges to meet in the first plea; accordingly it
could only be by pure chance that it contained really relevant
matter.1
Franz Kafka
The striking and seemingly sudden rise of the Internet has
had a dramatic effect upon public access to information. For a
minimal monthly fee—or even for no charge2—citizens with a
computer and a modem are able to instantly browse anything
from their Senator’s most recent musings in the Congressional
Record3 to the latest notices of proposed rulemaking in the Fed-
eral Register.4 Perhaps nowhere have the ramifications of such
readily available information been as intensely debated as they
have been in the legal profession. For twenty years, case law has
been electronically available to the bench and bar via the
WESTLAW and LEXIS computer-assisted legal research serv-
ices, albeit at a steep price.5 The prospect of an extensive body of
case law archived on the Internet and inexpensive CD-ROMs has
engendered a stormy and sometimes cantankerous debate among
information activists, law librarians, and legal publishers.
The courts of this country—for whom “[i]t is emphatically the
province and duty . . . to say what the law is”6—have slowly be-
gun to promulgate their decisions on “what the law is” over the
Internet.7 In part because of the enterprising offices of several
                                                                                                             
1. FRANZ KAFKA, THE TRIAL 115 (Willa & Edwin Muir trans., Schocken Books 1988)
(1925).
2. A number of communities throughout the United States have set up, generally
through public libraries, FreeNet systems that provide free access to the Internet. See Rob
Pegoraro, Free; The Info Freeway; On-Line on the Cheap, WASH. POST, June 28, 1995, at R5.
3. See Search Full Text of the Congressional Record—104th Congress, available at
http://thomas.loc.gov/home/r104query.html (Aug. 16, 1996).
4. See, e.g., GPO Access on the Web, available at http://thorplus.lib.purdue.edu/vlibrary/
reference/gpo/index.html (Aug. 16, 1996).
5. Both WESTLAW and LEXIS charge upwards of $200 per hour for the use of their
services. See Susan Hansen, Fending Off the Future, AM. LAW., Sept. 1994, at 76.
6. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177 (1803).
7. Although a bulletin board system (BBS) is not strictly a part of the Internet, each
U.S. Court of Appeals has a BBS through which decisions can be retrieved for 75 cents a mi-
nute. Laura Mansnerus, Easing Limits on Legal Publishing, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 9, 1995, at D5.
In addition, many state supreme courts place their opinions on a BBS as well. However, a
number of courts delete older cases on their BBSs and replace them with newer cases.
Morenike Efuntade, Alternative Case Citation Issue Examined by Joint DOJ-Judicial Group,
U.S. L. WEEK—DAILY ED., May 1, 1995, available in LEXIS, News library, Wires file. Moreo-
ver, a BBS can only be accessed by dialing—usually while incurring long distance tolls—a
dedicated phone line the court has set up for its BBS. See American Civil Liberties Union v.
Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824, 833-34 (E.D. Pa. 1996).
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law schools around the nation,8 the opinions of the U.S. Supreme
Court,9 all U.S. Courts of Appeals,10 and over a third of all state
supreme courts11 are now available on the Internet’s World Wide
Web. Far from providing a complete body of case law to the user,
however, these Web sites generally offer opinions dating back a
few years at most.12
More important, though, is the fact that the opinions on the
Internet are virtually useless to anyone who wishes to cite them
in a court document.13 Almost all federal courts and a large num-
ber of state courts require citations that contain the page num-
bers of West Publishing Company’s case reporters.14 Although it
is in almost all other respects an outstanding corporate citizen,
West’s assertion of copyright in its case reporter pagination15
                                                                                                             
8. See, e.g., Bill Rankin, Law Libraries: Emory Offering Court Rules, Legal Docu-
ments, ATLANTA J. & CONST., Feb. 14, 1996, at D7.
9. Decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court, available at http://www.law.cornell.edu/supct/
supct.table.html (Aug. 16, 1996) (providing all decisions since 1990).
10. A list of the U.S. Courts of Appeals, the addresses of the Web sites containing
their opinions, and the dates of the earliest opinions available may be found in the Ap-
pendix to this Comment.
11. As of August 1996, 19 state supreme courts had World Wide Web sites that pro-
vided and archived their opinions. A list of these courts, their Web site addresses, and the
dates of the earliest opinions available may be found in the Appendix to this Comment.
12. See Proposed Final Judgment and Competitive Impact Statement, United States
v. Thomson Corp., 61 Fed. Reg. 35,250, 35,261 (1996) (“The Internet does not provide ac-
cess to historical opinions.”).
13. Id. (“[T]he case law offered on the Internet does not provide citations that are ac-
cepted by courts or are relied on by attorneys.”).
14. See, e.g., D.C. CIR. R. 28(b) (“Citations to decisions of this court shall be to the
Federal Reporter.”); 3D CIR. R. 28.3(a) (“[C]itations to federal opinions that have been re-
ported shall be to the United States Reports, the Federal Reporter, the Federal Supplement
or the Federal Rules Decisions . . . .”); MISS. R. APP. P. 28(e) (“[A]ll Mississippi cases shall
be cited to both the Southern Reporter and, in cases decided prior to 1967, the official Mis-
sissippi Reports.”); IND. R. APP. P. 15(C) (“The North [E]astern Reporter shall constitute
the official reporter of the Indiana Supreme Court and the Indiana Court of Appeals.”).
15. West claims that the pagination in its reporters is a reflection of its copyrighted
selection and arrangement of cases and that the use of its page numbers therefore consti-
tutes copyright infringement. See West Publishing Co. v. Mead Data Cent., Inc., 799 F.2d
1219, 1227 (8th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1070 (1987); see also discussion infra part
III.A. Although West does not claim copyright in its case reporter pagination per se, see
Joint Stipulation of Facts ¶ 31, Oasis Publishing Co., Inc. v. West Publishing Co., 924 F.
Supp. 918 (D. Minn. 1996) (No. 3-95-563), for simplicity’s sake, this Comment treats West’s
claim of copyright in its selection and arrangement of cases as if it were a claim of copy-
right in the pagination of its reporters.
On February 26, 1996, the Thomson Corporation, a diversified Canadian publishing con-
cern, announced that it was purchasing West Publishing Company for $3.43 billion dol-
lars. See Iver Peterson, Thomson to Buy Legal Publisher in a $3.43 Billion Cash Accord,
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 27, 1996, at D1. The Justice Department gave conditional approval to the
purchase on June 19, 1996. See Iver Peterson, West Publishing Purchase by Thomson is
Approved, N.Y. TIMES, June 20, 1996, at D6. In addition to requiring West to sell off 58
electronic publications, the Justice Department’s settlement also requires West to license
the pagination of its case reporters. Id. The proposed final judgment specifically states,
however, that the settlement “should not be read to suggest that . . . a license is required”
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precludes the providers of opinions on the Internet and CD-ROMs
from including star pagination16 to the West reporters. The result
is clear: the judiciary says “what the law is,” yet drastically limits
its unfettered electronic use by requiring citation to case law en-
shrouded in the copyrighted print volumes of a private vendor.
While this limitation may be of little concern to the larger law
firms that can afford to conduct electronic legal research via
WESTLAW or LEXIS—or for that matter to the judiciary, to
whom these services are frequently provided either entirely free
or at steep discounts—less well-heeled parties are put at a disad-
vantage. In the end, the public pays, either through increased le-
gal services costs or less effective legal representation.
This Comment discusses the issues underlying the debate over
electronic case law citation. Part II provides an historical back-
ground that begins with the seminal case law copyright decisions
of the nineteenth century and concludes with the rise of the West
Publishing Company and LEXIS. Part III explores West Publish-
ing’s pagination copyright claim, from its recognition by the
Eighth Circuit in West Publishing Co. v. Mead Data Central,
Inc.,17 to its continuing tenability in light of the U.S. Supreme
Court’s 1991 decision in Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel e-
phone Service Co., Inc. 18 and ongoing litigation. Part III also ex-
amines the obstacles confronting the possibility of a complete ar-
chive of case law on the Internet and the more ready availability
of case law on inexpensive CD-ROMs. Part IV explores the alter-
native, medium-neutral citation systems that have recently been
offered and discusses the practical application of such a system,
using Florida as an example. Finally, Part V concludes that the
judiciary should recognize the changing nature of legal research
by moving to adopt a universal citation system that does not fa-
vor any particular vendor or medium.
                                                                                                             
and that the settlement “shall have no impact whatsoever on any adjudication concerning
these matters.” Proposed Final Judgment and Competitive Impact Statement, United
States v. Thomson Corp., 61 Fed. Reg. 35,250, 35,251 (1996). The pagination license
agreement itself provides for an escalating scale of royalties that begins at a yearly rate of
$.09 per 1,000 characters and increases to a yearly rate of $.13 per 1,000 characters by the
third year. Id. at 35,254. Critics have characterized the agreement as being too expensive,
and one CD-ROM publisher who does not currently use West’s pagination estimated that a
license would increase costs by 20 percent. Richard C. Reuben, Creating a Gentle Publish-
ing Giant, A.B.A. J., Aug. 1996, at 22.
16. Star pagination is “a feature whereby a published case . . . includes the internal
page breaks from another publisher’s version of the case.” Oasis Publishing Co., Inc. v.
West Publishing Co., 924 F. Supp 918, 921 (D. Minn. 1996).
17. 799 F.2d 1219 (8th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1070 (1987).
18. 499 U.S. 340 (1991).
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II.   HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
While there are a significant number of legal publishers in the
United States, West Publishing Company has, by virtue of the
judiciary’s case reporter citation requirements, established a de
facto monopoly over case law in this country. This notion of a
quasi-monopoly is further buttressed by West’s aggressive de-
fense of its copyright claim in the pagination of its case reporters.
However, the West defense is entirely at odds with the public
policy articulated in over 150 years of precedent, and rests solely
upon the decision of an Eighth Circuit panel that profoundly un-
derestimated the ramifications of its holding.
A.   The Copyrightability of Case Reporters
1.   Wheaton v. Peters
The Eighth Circuit’s decision to grant copyright protection to
West’s case reporter pagination19 was one of the more recent in a
long line of case reporter copyright decisions that stretch back to
the era of Chief Justice John Marshall.
In 1834, the Marshall Court decided Wheaton v. Peters .20 Rich-
ard Peters, Jr. began his tenure as the fourth Reporter of Deci-
sions for the U.S. Supreme Court in 1828.21 After recognizing the
prohibitive cost of owning a complete set of the Court’s opinions
to date, Peters developed a plan to publish the reports of his
predecessors’ twenty-five volumes in a condensed six-volume
version for less than a third of the price of the originals.22 Al-
though Peters planned to publish no more than “ ‘a “Digest” of the
facts of the Cases and the opinions of the Court,’ ”23 his immedi-
ate predecessor, Henry Wheaton, filed a bill in equity in 1831 al-
leging copyright infringement and seeking to enjoin Peters from
further publication of Peters’ Condensed Reports .24
                                                                                                             
19. See West Publishing Co. v. Mead Data Cent., Inc., 799 F.2d 1219 (8th Cir. 1986),
cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1070 (1987); see also discussion infra part III.A.
20. 33 U.S. 591 (1834).
21. See Craig Joyce, The Rise of the Supreme Court Reporter: An Institutional Per-
spective on Marshall Court Ascendancy, 83 MICH. L. REV. 1291, 1358 (1985).
22. Id. at 1365.
23. Id. at 1367 (quoting Letter from Richard Peters, Jr. to William Cranch (Aug. 14,
1828)).
24. Id. at 1370. The first three of the four volumes of Alexander Dallas, the unofficial
first Reporter of Decisions who died in 1817, had already entered the public domain. Id. at
1366 n.428. The 45 pages of Supreme Court decisions in Dallas’ fourth volume were appar-
ently of insufficient interest to his heirs and assigns to warrant litigation. Id. William
Cranch, the Court’s second Reporter of Decisions, agreed to settle with Peters out of court
in return for 50 copies of Peters’ Condensed Reports. Id. at 1369.
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Wheaton v. Peters  was the Supreme Court’s first decision on
copyright law.25 The Court found that rather than sanctioning
any existing common law copyright, the Copyright Act of 1790
created a new statutory right.26 To obtain this statutory right,
which Congress created to execute the Copyright Clause of the
Constitution,27 an author had to substantially comply with the
Congress’s requirements.28 More important, however, was the
Court’s pronouncement on what was, as one commentator has put
it, the “ultimate question in the case[:] . . . whether [judicial
opinions], embodying as they do the law of the land, might be the
subject of private property at all.”29 Justice McLean, writing for
the majority—and supplying no reasoning or analysis at all—
observed in a terse concluding paragraph that “[i]t may be proper
to remark that the court are unanimously of [the] opinion, that no
reporter has or can have any copyright in the written opinions
delivered by this court; and that the judges thereof cannot confer
on any reporter any such right.”30
The Court apparently adopted the reasoning of Peters’ coun-
sel. Thomas Sergeant had argued that the Court had supplied
its opinions to Wheaton “not for his own sake, but for the bene-
fit and use of the public; not for his own exclusive property, but
for the free and unrestrained use of the citizens of the United
States.”31 Peters’ other counsel, J.R. Ingersoll, was even more
blunt:
[I]n all countries that are subject to the sovereignty of the laws,
it is held that their promulgation is as essential as their exis-
tence. . . . The extended principles of national law . . . are fairly
and authoritatively known only as they are promulgated from
this bench. It is therefore the true policy, influenced by the es-
sential spirit of the government, that laws of every description
should be universally diffused. To fetter or restrain their dis-
semination, must be to counteract this policy. To limit, or even
to regulate it, would, in fact, produce the same effect. Nothing
                                                                                                             
25. See L. Ray Patterson & Craig Joyce, Monopolizing the Law: The Scope of Copy-
right Protection for Law Reports and Statutory Compilations, 36 UCLA L. REV. 719, 732
(1989).
26. Wheaton v. Peters, 33 U.S. 591, 661 (1834).
27. Congress has the power “[t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by
securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective
Writings and Discoveries.” U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
28. Wheaton, 33 U.S. at 664.
29. Patterson & Joyce, supra note 25, at 733.
30. Wheaton, 33 U.S. at 668.
31. Id. at 638.
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can be done, consistently with our free institutions, except to
encourage it and promote it.32
The impact of the Court’s opinion was sudden and extensive.
Where case reports had once been scarce because of the inflated
prices charged by the owners of copyrights in the volumes, pub-
lishers around the country now raced to put out their own, pre-
sumably lower-priced editions.33 The law was thus more readily
available to the citizenry than ever before. Wheaton laid the
foundation for the Court’s “bedrock policy . . . that the public
should have maximum access to the law.”34
2.   Callaghan v. Myers
In 1888, the Court affirmed Wheaton in Banks v. Manchester ,35
framing its holding denying copyright to the work of an official
state reporter as a matter of public policy.36 The Court had yet to
rule, however, upon the thornier question of whether anyone
might be entitled to copyright in case reporters as whole. That
opportunity came almost immediately. Callaghan v. Myers ,37 de-
cided the same term as Banks, involved a fact pattern similar to
Wheaton. Callaghan & Co. owned the copyright on the first
thirty-one volumes of the Illinois Supreme Court Reports, while
E.B. Myers owned the copyright on volumes thirty-two through
forty-six.38 Callaghan, wishing to publish a complete set of re-
ports, attempted to buy the rights to the subsequent volumes
from Myers.39 Callaghan refused to pay the price asked by Myers,
however, and proceeded to reprint the Myers volumes with,
among other things, marginally altered headnotes.40 Myers sued
Callaghan. Despite Callaghan’s argument that it had edited the
opinions on its own, the circuit court found that the Callaghan
                                                                                                             
32. Id. at 619-20.
33. Patterson & Joyce, supra note 25, at 734.
34. Id. at 742.
35. 128 U.S. 244 (1888).
36. Id. at 253:
Judges . . . can themselves have no pecuniary interest or proprietorship, as
against the public at large, in the fruits of their judicial labors. . . . The ques-
tion is one of public policy, and there has always been a judicial consensus,
from the time of [Wheaton], that no copyright could, under the statutes passed
by [C]ongress, be secured in the products of the labor done by judicial officers
in the discharge of their judicial duties. The whole work done by the judges
constitutes the authentic exposition and interpretation of the law, which,
binding every citizen, is free for publication to all . . . .
37. 128 U.S. 617 (1888).
38. Id. at 619-20.
39. Id. at 622.
40. Id.
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reprints infringed Myers’ copyright.41 The Supreme Court af-
firmed.42
Justice Blatchford’s opinion reaffirmed Wheaton, yet held that,
in the absence of a statute to the contrary, public policy did not
prohibit a reporter of cases from obtaining a copyright to protect
his own intellectual property in a volume of law reports.43 As to
which material comprised a reporter’s intellectual property, the
Court found that this was “the matter not embracing the written
opinions of the court, namely, the title-page, table of cases, head-
notes, statements of facts, arguments of counsel, and index.”44 In
dictum, Justice Blatchford noted:
Such work of the reporter, which may be the lawful subject of
copyright, comprehends also the order of arrangement of the
cases, the division of reports into volumes, the numbering and
paging of the volumes, the table of the cases cited in the opin-
ions, (where such table is made,) and the subdivision of the in-
dex into appropriate, condensed titles, involving the distribu-
tion of the subjects of the various head-notes, and cross-
references, where such exist. A publication of the mere opinions
of the court, in a volume, without more, would be comparatively
valueless to any one.45
Although Justice Blatchford seemed to be announcing that the
pagination of case reporters and their arrangement of cases are
the lawful subject of copyright, he contradicted this notion later
in the opinion when he stated that the Court “concur[red] with
the conclusions of [Circuit Court] Judge Drummond.”46 One of
those conclusions, quoted approvingly by the Court, was that
[t]he fact appears to be, and, indeed, it is not a subject of con-
troversy, that in arranging the order of cases, and in the paging
of the different volumes, [Myer’s] edition has been followed by
the defendants; but, while this is so, I should not feel inclined,
merely on that account, and independent of other matters to
give a decree to the plaintiff, although it is claimed that the ar-
rangement of the cases and the paging of the volumes are pro-
tected by a copyright. Undoubtedly, in some cases, where are
involved labor, talent, judgment, the classification and disposi-
                                                                                                             
41. Id. at 625.
42. Id. at 667. Because Myers had apparently failed to deposit volume 32 for copy-
right protection by the required deadline of three months following publication, the Court
reversed and remanded the circuit court’s decree with respect to that volume. Id.; see also
id. at 655.
43. Id. at 647.
44. Id. at 649.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 661.
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tion of subjects in a book entitle it to a copyright. But the ar-
rangement of law cases and the paging of the book may depend
simply on the will of the printer, of the reporter, or publisher,
or the order in which the cases have been decided, or upon
other accidental circumstances. . . . [T]he arrangement of cases
and the paging of the volumes is a labor inconsiderable in itself,
and I regard it, not as an independent matter, but in connection
with other similarities existing between the two editions . . . .47
Professors Craig Joyce and L. Ray Patterson point out that the
seeming inconsistency disappears when viewed from a perspec-
tive grounded in nineteenth-century copyright theory. Myers’
volumes were compilations consisting of distinct elements, and in
the nineteenth century, copyright vested “ ‘in the materials as
combined and arranged; in the union of form and substance. Any
one may use the same materials in a different combination, or
adopt a similar arrangement for different selections.’ ”48 Thus,
while the Court might have drawn the distinction more clearly, it
evidently viewed arrangement and pagination as merely two
elements that are not to be considered independently of the work
as a whole.
3.   Banks Law Publishing Co. v. Lawyers’ Co-operative
Publishing Co.
Unlike Callaghan, the Second Circuit’s 1909 decision in Banks
Law Publishing Co. v. Lawyers’ Co-operative Publishing Co. 49 re-
volved entirely around the issue of copyright in case reporter ar-
rangement and pagination. In 1882, in response to the lack of
ready availability of U.S. Supreme Court decisions, the Lawyers’
Co-operative Publishing Company (Lawyers’ Co-op) decided to
utilize a new printing technology involving stereotype plates and
produce low-cost sets of Supreme Court reports.50 The Banks Law
Publishing Company published and owned the copyright in the
United States Reports , the official reporter of the U.S. Supreme
                                                                                                             
47. Id. at 661-62 (quoting Myers v. Callaghan, 20 F. 441, 442 (C.C.N.D Ill. 1884))
(emphasis added).
48. Patterson & Joyce, Monopolizing the Law, supra note 25, at 739 (quoting EATON
S. DRONE, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF PROPERTY IN INTELLECTUAL PRODUCTIONS IN GREAT
BRITAIN AND THE UNITED STATES 156 (1879)).
49. 169 F. 386 (2d Cir. 1909) (per curiam), appeal dismissed per stipulation, 223 U.S.
738 (1911).
50. THOMAS A. WOXLAND & PATTI J. OGDEN, LANDMARKS IN AMERICAN LEGAL
PUBLISHING 41 (1990). The need for low-cost sets of Supreme Court opinions was under-
standable: complete sets of the 103 volumes of the U.S. Reports cost 500 dollars in 1882.
Id. Lawyers’ Co-op sold their editions for a dollar per volume. Id.
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Court.51 When Lawyers’ Co-op began using star pagination to the
U.S. Reports in its Lawyers’ Edition  of Supreme Court cases,
Banks sued in equity, alleging infringement via the arrangement
of cases, the division into volumes, the table of cases, and star
pagination.52
Reducing the issue to whether arrangement and pagination
were copyrightable, the trial court found for Lawyer’s Co-op.53
The Second Circuit, in a per curiam opinion, affirmed the lower
court’s findings, stating that “the arrangement of reported cases
in sequence, their paging and distribution into volumes, are not
features of such importance as to entitle the reporter to copyright
protection of such details.”54 The court derived this language from
the trial judge’s opinion, which the Second Circuit adopted as its
own.55 Commenting upon the testimony at trial describing Banks’
selection and arrangement of cases, the trial court said:
It is inconceivable to me that to merely arrange the cases in se-
quence (though concededly the reporter uses good judgment in
so doing) and paging the volumes—things essential to be done
to produce the volumes—are features or characteristics of such
importance as to entitle him to copyright protection of such de-
tails. In my estimation no valid copyright for these elements or
details alone can be secured to the official reporter. A different
question would be presented if, for instance, infringement of
the headnotes, or syllabuses, index digest, synopses of argu-
ments or statements of the cases, or an abridgment thereof
were claimed.56
The trial court then quoted, in full, the Callaghan trial court’s
remarks concerning arrangement and pagination, which Justice
Blatchford had excerpted in his opinion. Remarking upon the
significance of Justice Blatchford’s approving quotation to the
holding in Callaghan, the Lawyers’ Co-op  trial court observed:
This excerpt conspicuously intimates that, if the elements in-
fringed consisted simply of the arrangement of the cases and
the pagination, a different conclusion would have been reached.
No authority is cited which supports the contention that
complainant is entitled to be protected in its pagination and ar-
rangement of cases where the substance of the origination is
not pirated . . . . [F]or another to simply adopt the plan and
                                                                                                             
51. Lawyers’ Co-op, 169 F. at 386.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 391.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 390.
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grouping of the cases, making marginal reference to the paging
of the volumes issued under his direction, without in any way
pirating the substance of his origination, is not enough, in my
judgment, to establish infringement.57
After briefly referring to a Sixth Circuit case in which the
plaintiff was denied an injunction against a competing volume
containing the laws of Michigan,58 the trial court concluded:
“Applying this holding to the facts under consideration, an action
for infringement does not lie if the defendant’s asserted wrongdo-
ing simply consisted of reprinting the decisions of the court with
the paging, the defendant independently supplying headnotes,
statements of cases, etc.”59
Lawyers’ Co-op  cleared up whatever confusion Justice Blatch-
ford had introduced into the maximum access policy underlying
the Wheaton line of cases with his seemingly conflicting remarks
about the copyrightability of pagination and arrangement of case
reporters. The clear holding of Lawyers’ Co-op  is that the pagina-
tion and arrangement of court opinions are, as a matter of public
policy, insufficient intellectual labor to warrant copyright protec-
tion.60 Although the Lawyers’ Co-op  court reasoned that the pagi-
nation and arrangement of cases were elements necessary to the
official reporter’s statutory duties61—something the Eighth Cir-
cuit pointedly noted in its decision in West Publishing Co. v.
Mead Data Central, Inc. 62—the court went on to remark that, in
other circumstances not involving case reporters, the pagination
and arrangement “of the material matter of a book may be the
subject of a valid copyright.”63 The court was understandably not
able to foresee a time when court rules of citation would trans-
                                                                                                             
57. Id.
58. See Howell v. Miller, 91 F. 129 (6th Cir. 1898). The Lawyers’ Co-op trial court
quoted Justice Harlan’s opinion in Howell:
If Miller had cut from Howell’s books, delivered to him by the state, the general
laws of Michigan as therein printed, and the pages so cut out had been used
when his compilation was printed—if this had been done, and nothing more—
there would have been no ground of complaint.
Lawyers’ Co-op, 169 F. at 390-91 (quoting Howell, 91 F. at 137).
59. Lawyers’ Co-op, 169 F. at 391.
60. See id. at 390.
61. See id. (“[T]he statute prescribing his duties does not point out how the cases
shall be arranged into volumes and printed, but to fittingly reproduce the decisions and
opinions in volumes it is necessary to supply pagings, together with an orderly arrange-
ment of the cases.”).
62. 799 F.2d 1219, 1225-26 (8th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1070 (1987); see also
discussion infra part III.A.
63. Lawyers’ Co-op, 169 F. at 390.
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form the nominally unofficial status of a reporter into all but of-
ficial status.
B.   The Rise of West and the Emergence of LEXIS
1.   West Publishing Company: “Everywhere Familiar”
The West Publishing Company came into being amidst this
evolution of nineteenth-century copyright jurisprudence involving
case reporters. John B. West was a traveling salesman for an of-
fice supply company in Minnesota.64 Having the opportunity to
visit a number of attorneys, he discovered a common complaint:
the publication of official court reports frequently lagged far be-
hind the date courts issued their opinions.65 Sensing a business
opportunity, the twenty-four-year-old West began publishing The
Syllabi in 1876.66 An eight-page weekly, The Syllabi promised
“prompt and reliable intelligence as to the various questions ad-
judicated by the Minnesota Courts at a date long prior to the
publication of the State Reports.”67 Within six months, The Syl-
labi’s growth and popularity were such that West revamped the
format and coverage, renaming the publication the North Western
Reporter and including the full text of all Minnesota Supreme
Court decisions, Minnesota federal court decisions, and Wisconsin
Supreme Court decisions “of special importance.”68
Two years later, in 1879, John West transformed his publica-
tion into the first of his company’s modern regional reporters.69
The North Western Reporter  contained the full text of all supreme
court decisions from Iowa, Minnesota, Michigan, Nebraska, Wis-
consin, and the Dakota Territory.70 Over the next two years, West
began publishing the Federal Reporter  and the Supreme Court
Reporter.71 In 1885, the West Publishing Company, as it was now
known, began publishing four new regional reporters, completing
                                                                                                             
64. WOXLAND & OGDEN, supra note 50, at 38.
65. Id. This complaint provides an eerie parallel to the issue facing the legal publish-
ing industry today. The print publication of court opinions still lags behind the date courts
issue their opinions (albeit to a considerably lesser extent than in John West’s day). How-
ever, the electronic publication of court opinions is virtually instantaneous. The modern-
day version of the complaint John West heard is that these instantly published electronic
opinions are useless because courts expect citations to the print versions. For a solution to
this problem, see discussion infra part IV.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id.
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what would eventually be known as the National Reporter Sys-
tem.72 West Publishing thus became the first legal publishing
company to provide nationwide coverage of court decisions. Be-
cause the National Reporter System published every appellate
case in the country, West was criticized for being indiscrimi-
nate—for being a “waste-basket” or “blanket” publisher.73 West
took pride in this criticism, however, explaining that “[i]t is one of
the greatest merits of the National Reporter System that it gives
all the cases.”74
In 1887, West introduced the American Digest , an annual
publication which contained digests of all the cases handed down
in a given year.75 In 1889, West hired John A. Mallory to work on
the American Digest .76 Mallory’s plan was to transform the
American Digest  into an annual update of a new publication, a
comprehensive digest entitled the Century Edition of the Amer i-
can Digest, which would cover cases from 1658 through 1896.77
Mallory completed the first volume in 1897 and promoted it at
the annual meeting of the American Bar Association.78 The
American Digest , with its comprehensive classification system—
to be dubbed the “Key Number” system in 190879—was a rousing
success. It soon became the standard system for conducting legal
research. As West Publishing itself noted in the introduction to
the First Decennial Edition of the American Digest , “The Ameri-
can Digest classification is now everywhere familiar to the bar; it
is taught in law schools and in law offices . . . .”80
West’s success grew with the twentieth century. In addition to
setting the standard for legal research methods, West’s compre-
hensive case reporter coverage enabled it to become the de facto
official reporter for a number of jurisdictions. As of 1995, nine-
teen states had no official reporter, presumably requiring citation
to one of West’s National Reporter System volumes.81 Thirty-one
                                                                                                             
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 40 (quoting A Symposium of Law Publishers, 23 AM. L. REV. 396, 406-407
(1889)).
75. Id. at 60.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id. (quoting 1 FIRST DECENNIAL EDITION OF THE AMERICAN DIGEST vii (1908)).
81. See Robert Berring, On Not Throwing Out the Baby: Planning the Future of Le-
gal Information, 83 CAL. L. REV. 615, 633 n.66 (1995). Professor Berring, in an
“informal survey,” found that only seven of the states without official reporters required
citation to West publications. Id. at 631 n.61. However, in the absence of any alterna-
tive citation system, it is difficult to imagine a different source, save perhaps the not
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states still have official reporters, a number of which are pub-
lished by West.82 In addition, while the official reporter of the
U.S. Supreme Court remains the U.S. Reports, federal district
and circuit courts have no official reporter; the de facto official
reporters are West’s Federal Reporter  and Federal Supplement .83
Finally, and perhaps most notably, the fifteenth edition of The
Bluebook eliminated its requirement of parallel citation to both a
state’s official reporter and a West NRS reporter for out-of-state
documents, requiring instead citation to West’s NRS alone.84
Nevertheless, West’s preeminence in legal publishing and legal
research has been tied to its dominance of the printed page. The
advent of the computer as an alternative, if not preferred, method
of conducting legal research planted the seeds of a still-
continuing revolution.
2.   The Arrival of LEXIS
In the early 1960s, a team of University of Pittsburgh employ-
ees working under Professor John Horty converted the public
health statutes of all fifty states into digital form, using punched
cards whose codes were transferred to magnetic tape.85 Horty’s
team moved beyond statutes, and by 1965 had put a selection of
U.S. Supreme Court and Pennsylvania cases on magnetic tape.86
To demonstrate the system, Horty would occasionally allow
search requests by lawyers, who would mail or telephone their
searches and, after the system ran the search overnight, would
receive their search results by mail or telephone the next day.87
                                                                                                             
terribly economical WESTLAW or LEXIS, to which a court in the remaining 12 states
could allow citation.
82. See id. at 624 n.37. West only admits to publishing the official reporter for eight
states. See Joint Stipulation of Facts ¶ 72, Oasis Publishing Co., Inc. v. West Publishing
Co., 924 F. Supp. 918 (D. Minn. 1996) (No. 3-95-563).
83. Professor Berring’s informal survey turned up only 15 of 101 federal district and
circuit courts that require citation to West publications. Id. at 631 n.61. Although West is
the only publisher of lower federal court decisions in comprehensive book form, see Mat-
thew Bender & Co., Inc. v. West Publishing Co., No. 94 Civ. 0589, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
17688, at *1-2 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 28, 1995), presumably there is some flexibility allowed in ci-
tation to opinions not yet published in the Federal Reporter or the Federal Supplement.
84. THE BLUEBOOK: A UNIFORM SYSTEM OF CITATION 169-215 (15th ed. 1991). Aside
from law reviews, a number of courts require adherence to The Bluebook’s citation re-
quirements in court documents. See, e.g., FLA. R. APP. P. 9.800(n) (“All other citations shall
be in the form prescribed by the latest edition of The Bluebook . . . .”).
 85. William G. Harrington, A Brief History of Computer-Assisted Legal Research, 77
LAW LIBR. J. 543, 544 (1985).
86. Id.
87. Id.
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The Ohio State Bar Association had heard of Horty’s work.88
Deciding to develop a computer-assisted legal research service for
Ohio lawyers, the Ohio group set forth a definition of the service
it wanted: a nonindexed, full-text, on-line, and interactive sys-
tem.89 Nonindexing freed the user from the more rigid indexing
systems such as the one used by the West digests, allowing the
creation of “an ad hoc index specific to the problem at hand.”90
Full-text searching was a departure as well; traditional legal re-
search with index-based digests involved searching headnotes or
summaries.91 On-line searching allowed the user to contact the
computer directly, rather than by communicating search requests
to intermediaries.92 Finally, interactivity allowed the user to in-
stantly respond to the results of a search by either amending or
resubmitting search terms.93
The Ohio group, now organized into a nonprofit corporation
called Ohio Bar Automated Research (OBAR), entered into a con-
tract with Data Corporation, which had developed a nonindexed,
full-text, on-line, and interactive system for the Air Force called
(Data) Central.94 The results of the OBAR experiment were
mixed: while OBAR had demonstrated the feasibility of com-
puter-assisted legal research, it had a number of problems that
could only be solved by the investment of significant financial re-
sources.95 In 1969, the Mead Corporation acquired Data Corpora-
tion, apparently unaware of the latter’s contractual obligation to
OBAR.96 Mead, however, recognized the potential for computer-
assisted legal research and invested in and improved the sys-
tem.97 It formed a subsidiary, Mead Data Central (MDC), to de-
velop and market the research service.98 The OBAR organization
sold its interest in the system to MDC.99 By the end of 1972, MDC
had made a number of improvements to the system, switching
from printers to display terminals and revising the language and
logic of the system.100 MDC dubbed the new system LEXIS and
                                                                                                             
88. Id. at 545.
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90. Id. at 546.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id.
 94. Id. at 547-48.
95. Id. at 549-50.
96. Id. at 550.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 551.
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introduced it at a news conference in April 1973.101 By the end of
the year, a number of major New York law firms were performing
legal research on LEXIS.102
That same year, the West Publishing Company decided to en-
ter the computer-assisted legal research business.103 Its system—
WESTLAW—went on-line exactly two years after MDC intro-
duced LEXIS.104 Unlike LEXIS, however, the WESTLAW data-
base consisted entirely of West headnotes rather than the full
text of opinions.105 By the end of 1976, West began to build a full-
text database.106 Nevertheless, WESTLAW was widely regarded
throughout the rest of the 1970s as vastly inferior to LEXIS.107 In
1980, West began an overhaul of WESTLAW, adding new fea-
tures and remedying design deficiencies such as the prolonged
search times and frequent interruptions that had plagued the
system in the 1970s.108 By 1984, WESTLAW had become “a highly
sophisticated, user-friendly research service.”109 Possessing few
advantages over WESTLAW, MDC announced in June 1985 that
it would do something very much like what Lawyers’ Co-op had
done almost a century earlier: it would provide star pagination in
its database to the West National Reporter System.110
III.   DECONSTRUCTING THE WEST “MONOPOLY”
And then he continued: “Besides, you were quite right in what
you said; I am in the confidence of the Court.” He paused, as if
he wanted to give K. time to digest this fact. . . . K. abandoned
any attempt at apology, for he did not want to deflect the con-
versation, nor did he want the painter to feel too important,
and so become in a sense inaccessible, accordingly he asked: “Is
your position an official appointment?” “No,” said the painter
curtly, as if the question had cut him short. K., being anxious to
keep him going, said: “Well, such unrecognized posts often
carry more influence with them than the official ones.”111
Franz Kafka
                                                                                                             
101. Id. at 552-53.
102. Id. at 553.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 554.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. See Dan Oberdorfer, West-Mead Data Copyright Suit Hearing Slated, NAT’L L.J.,
Sept. 9, 1985, at 20.
111. KAFKA, supra note 1, at 147-48.
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A.   West Publishing Co. v. Mead Data Central, Inc.
West responded to MDC’s plans to implement star pagination
in LEXIS by seeking an injunction in a Minnesota federal district
court.112 The district court granted the injunction,113 and MDC ap-
pealed. The Eighth Circuit affirmed, finding that “West’s ar-
rangement is a copyrightable aspect of its compilation of cases,
that the pagination of West’s volumes reflects and expresses
West’s arrangement, and that MDC’s intended use of West’s page
numbers infringes West’s copyright in the arrangement.”114
1.   The Opinion
The majority opinion in Mead methodically addressed MDC’s
series of arguments. MDC contended that case arrangement was
per se uncopyrightable because it could meet neither the stan-
dard of originality nor the standard for consideration as the
original work of an author,115 both of which are basic require-
ments under the Copyright Act of 1976.116 In response, the court
pointed out that the standard for originality was minimal,
meaning only that the work must have its origin with the
author,117 and that a work must be the product of only a slight
degree of creative or intellectual labor to be the original work of
an author.118 Furthermore, the court observed that the Copyright
Act provided protection for compilations and derivative works119
and noted that “[a]n arrangement of opinions in a case reporter,
no less than a compilation and arrangement of Shakespeare’s
sonnets, can qualify for copyright protection.”120 As support for its
proposition, the court cited Callaghan.121 Although noting the
seeming discrepancy between Justice Blatchford’s allusion to the
copyrightability of pagination and arrangement and his approv-
                                                                                                             
112. Id.
113. West Publishing Co. v. Mead Data Cent., Inc., 616 F. Supp 1571, 1574 (D. Minn.
1985), aff’d, 799 F.2d 1219 (8th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1070 (1987).
114. West Publishing Co. v. Mead Data Cent., Inc., 799 F.2d 1219, 1223 (8th Cir.
1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1070 (1987). West and MDC eventually settled out of court,
with MDC reportedly agreeing to pay “tens of millions of dollars” to purchase a license
from West for the use of its page numbers. Stephen Labaton, Westlaw and Lexis Near
Truce, N.Y. TIMES, July 19, 1988, at D5.
115. Id.
116. See 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1994).
117. Mead, 799 F.2d at 1223 (citing Hutchinson Tel. Co. v. Fronteer Directory Co., 770
F.2d 128, 131 (8th Cir. 1985)).
118. Id. (citing Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546, 561 (1973); MELVIN NIMMER, 1
NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 1.08(C)(1) (1985)).
119. Id. at 1223-24 (citing 17 U.S.C. §§ 101, 103).
120. Id. at 1224.
121. Id.
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ing quotation of the circuit court’s opinion indicating a different
result,122 the court nonetheless extracted a rule of sorts:
“Callaghan establishes at least that there is no per se rule ex-
cluding case arrangement from copyright protection, and that in-
stead, in each case the arrangement must be evaluated in light of
the originality and intellectual-creation standards.”123
MDC also argued that Lawyers’ Co-op  strongly supported its
contention that case arrangement and pagination were insuffi-
cient to meet the required originality standard.124 The Eighth Cir-
cuit, however, dismissed this contention, finding that the official
status of the reporter in Lawyers’ Co-op  was dispositive in the
denial of copyright protection.125 MDC maintained further that
the holding in Lawyers’ Co-op  did not depend upon the reporter’s
official status because the statute prescribing his duties did not
specify how to arrange the cases or paginate the volumes.126 Thus,
MDC argued, the reporter exercised discretion and judgment in
case arrangement and pagination, elements which the Lawyers’
Co-op court must have viewed as involving insufficient intellec-
tual labor for copyright purposes.127 The Eighth Circuit agreed
that the reporter had exercised independent judgment, but noted
that the Lawyers’ Co-op  court “dismissed the matters in which
the reporter exercised discretion as things done ‘voluntarily and
in evident compliance with the proper and faithful discharge of
his official duties.’ ”128 Moreover, the court continued, the Law-
yers’ Co-op court did not reach the question of whether that
judgment met the originality and intellectual creation require-
ments because “it was unwilling to look past the fact that
[arrangement and pagination] were done to meet the reporter’s
statutory obligations.”129 Additionally, the court pointed out that
Callaghan involved an official reporter as well, yet the Callaghan
Court did not find pagination and arrangement of cases per se
uncopyrightable.130 Concluding its discussion of Lawyers’ Co-op ,
                                                                                                             
122. Id. at 1225 (“The teaching of Callaghan with respect to the issues before us does
not come through with unmistakable clarity.”).
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id. (“[T]he ultimate rationale for the [Lawyers’ Co-op] decision was that . . . be-
cause the reporter’s statutory duties required case arrangement and pagination, these
should not be considered the product of the reporter’s intellectual labor.”).
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 1226 (quoting Banks Law Publishing Co. v. Lawyers’ Co-op. Publishing Co.,
169 F. 386, 389-90 (2d Cir. 1909)).
129. Id.
130. Id.
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the majority noted that the Second Circuit had required “a
greater degree of intellectual creativity than the trend of modern
cases” and had written its decision at a time when compilations
and derivative works were neither expressly defined nor included
in the Copyright Act.131
MDC added a twist to the discussion of official reporter status:
it argued that West was indeed the official reporter for some
states, and that therefore Lawyers’ Co-op , regardless of the
linchpin upon which it turned, supported MDC’s view that West
could not copyright its case arrangement and pagination.132 The
majority, however, viewed the denomination of a West’s regional
reporter as “official” in orders discontinuing official state report-
ers as “mean[ing] something quite different from the title ‘official
reporter’ held by Messrs. Wheaton and Peters.”133 The court said
it did “not believe” that any state employed West and controlled
the details of its work.134 Furthermore, the court added, even if it
were willing to grant that West had some official status, it found
that West had used “sufficient talent and industry in compiling
and arranging cases” to qualify for copyright protection.135
Finding that there was nothing to preclude copyright in case
arrangement and pagination, the Eighth Circuit then described
what it felt was West’s “sufficient talent and industry” to meet
the originality and intellectual creativity requirements.136 West,
according to the court, “collect[ed]” the opinions, separated state
court decisions from federal court decisions, and assigned them—
                                                                                                             
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id. Curiously, the Third Circuit came to the opposite conclusion about West dur-
ing litigation unrelated to copyright claims. See Lowenschuss v. West Publishing Co., 542
F.2d 180, 186 (3d Cir. 1976) (“Where, as here, no official reporter exists, a convincing ar-
gument may be made that West, an unofficial reporter, performs the same function as an
official reporter and should be accorded the identical protection from liability for defama-
tion when it publishes verbatim opinions of the courts.”).
134. Mead, 799 F.2d at 1226. It is interesting to speculate what the Mead court would
have made of Florida’s codified arrangement with West. See FLA. STAT. § 25.381 (1995)
(“[T]he Supreme Court and the Attorney General shall jointly enter into a contract with
West Publishing . . . providing for the publication . . . of Florida Cases . . . .”). A Minnesota
federal district court would later find that regardless of whether Florida viewed West as
its official reporter, the state’s contractual agreement reserving case arrangement copy-
right in West eliminated official status as a dispositive consideration. See Oasis Publishing
Co., Inc. v. West Publishing Co., 924 F. Supp. 918, 930 (D. Minn. 1996); see also discussion
infra part III.B.
135. Mead, 799 F.2d at 1226.
136. It is worth noting at this point that the majority did not rely upon anything con-
tained in the record for its examination of West’s arrangement and pagination process. See
id. at 1237 (Oliver, J., dissenting) (“The record in this case does not indicate in any way
how or by whom West’s page numbers are, in fact, created.”). In later litigation, West
would stipulate as to its arrangement process. See infra note 234 and accompanying text.
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on a geographical basis for state decisions and by court level for
federal decisions—to the appropriate West reporter.137 West then
assigned opinions to a particular volume of the reporter and ar-
ranged them within the volume.138 The court concluded that the
process was “the result of considerable labor, talent, and judg-
ment” and easily met the intellectual creativity requirement.139
Because it found West was entitled to copyright its arrange-
ments, the court reduced MDC’s argument to its “insistence that
all West seeks to protect is numbers on pages.”140 The court
agreed that if this were the case, MDC would win, because a
mere sequence of numbers is not copyrightable.141 However, the
court reasoned that
protection for the numbers is not sought for their own sake. It
is sought, rather, because access to these particular numbers—
the “jump cites”—would give users of LEXIS a large part of
what West has spent so much labor and industry in compiling,
and would pro tanto reduce anyone’s need to buy West’s books.
The key to this case, then, is not whether numbers are copy-
rightable, but whether the copyright on the books as a whole is
infringed by the unauthorized appropriation of these particular
numbers.142
The court went on to hold that the use of the page numbers would
infringe West’s copyright in its arrangement.143 To support its
analysis, the majority used the example of LEXIS’s LEXSEE fea-
ture. A hypothetical LEXIS user might call up the first page in a
West volume, page down through to the last page of the case, and
then, having discerned the page number of the following case, use
LEXSEE to bring that case to the screen.144 LEXSEE would thus
“permit LEXIS users to view the arrangement of cases in every
volume of West’s National Reporter System.”145 Moreover, the
court found that even if this procedure were not possible, it would
still find that MDC’s uses of star pagination infringed West’s
copyright.146 This was so, the court reasoned, because the jump
cites within LEXIS cases gave LEXIS users the precise location
                                                                                                             
137. Mead, 799 F.2d at 1226.
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139. Id. at 1226-27. The court also found that West met the originality requirement
because West did not copy its cases from another source. Id. at 1227.
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in West’s case arrangement of that portion of the opinion the user
is viewing.147 In addition, the court observed that MDC’s star
pagination would obviate the need for consumers to purchase
West’s reporters and would thus adversely affect West’s market
position.148
Finally, in response to MDC’s argument that the star pagina-
tion was not an infringement because West’s page numbers were
statements of pure fact, the court observed that MDC’s proposed
use of these facts was closer to constituting wholesale appropria-
tion of the arrangement rather than an isolated use of the ar-
rangement’s factual aspects.149 To support its reasoning that such
an appropriation was an infringement, the majority cited
Hutchinson Telephone Co. v. Fronteer Directory ,150 a case the
Eighth Circuit had decided a year earlier: “The names, addresses,
and phone numbers in a telephone directory are ‘facts’; though
isolated use of these facts is not copyright infringement, copying
each and every listing is an infringement.”151
2.   Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Co., Inc.
Five years after Mead, the U.S. Supreme Court decided Feist
Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Co., Inc. 152 Because
Feist was the Supreme Court’s first opportunity to interpret the
1976 Copyright Act’s express provision granting copyright pro-
tection to factual compilations and derivative works,153 it has a
significant impact on any analysis of the holding in Mead.
Rural Telephone Service Company, Inc., a public utility that
provided telephone service in Kansas, published a telephone di-
rectory consisting of both white and yellow pages.154 Feist Publi-
cations, Inc., published telephone directories that covered wider
geographic areas than is otherwise the norm.155 Rural refused to
license its listings to Feist.156 Feist nevertheless extracted listings
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148. Id. at 1228.
149. Id.
150. 770 F.2d 128 (8th Cir. 1985).
151. Mead, 799 F.2d at 1228.
152. 499 U.S. 340 (1991).
153. An exhaustive look at Feist and its ramifications is beyond the scope of this Com-
ment. For a detailed examination of Feist, see Jane C. Ginsburg, No “Sweat”? Copyright
and Other Protection of Works of Information After Feist v. Rural Telephone, 92 COLUM. L.
REV. 338 (1992).
154. Feist, 499 U.S. at 342.
155. Id. at 342-43.
156. Id. at 343.
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from Rural’s directory and published them in its own directory.157
Rural sued for copyright infringement, the district court granted
summary judgment to Rural, and the Court of Appeals af-
firmed.158
The Feist Court began its inquiry by noting the tension be-
tween two “well-established propositions”: (1) facts are not copy-
rightable; and (2) compilations of facts “generally” are copyrigh-
table.159 The difference between the two lies in the requirement of
originality, which the Court said “means only that the work was
independently created by the author . . . and that it possesses at
least some minimal degree of creativity.”160 The level of creativity
required “is extremely low; even a slight amount will suffice.”161
The originality requirement, the Court added, is rooted in Article
I, Section 8 of the Constitution, in which the terms “ ‘authors’
[and] ‘writings’ . . . presuppose a degree of originality.”162 Because
facts do not owe their origin to an act of authorship, they are not
original.163 Compilations, however, are different:
Factual compilations, on the other hand, may possess the req-
uisite originality. The compilation author typically chooses
which facts to include, in what order to place them, and how to
arrange the collected data so that they may be used effectively
by readers. These choices as to selection and arrangement, so
long as they are made independently by the compiler and entail
a minimal degree of creativity, are sufficiently original that
Congress may protect such compilations through the copyright
laws . . . . Thus, even a directory that contains absolutely no
protectible written expression, only facts, meets the constitu-
tional minimum for copyright protection if it features an origi-
nal selection or arrangement.164
Nonetheless, the Court found that the copyright protection af-
forded to factual compilations is limited in a significant respect:
“The mere fact that a work is copyrighted does not mean that
every element of the work may be protected.”165 Only those ele-
ments original to the author are entitled to copyright protec-
tion.166 If a factual compilation contains nothing but facts, protec-
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tion is extended only to the selection and arrangement of those
facts, and then only if the selection and arrangement are
“original.”167 Thus, the Court observed, “copyright in a factual
compilation is thin.”168
The Feist Court repudiated the “sweat of the brow” line of fac-
tual compilation cases169 in which “the underlying notion was that
copyright was a reward for the hard work that went into compil-
ing facts.”170 The “sweat of the brow” doctrine, the Court said,
went beyond extending copyright protection to selection and ar-
rangement and extended protection to the facts themselves.171
Moreover, Congress had recognized the mistaken assumption of
this line of cases and rectified it by defining “compilation” in the
Copyright Act of 1976: “A ‘compilation’ is a work formed by the
collection and assembling of preexisting materials or of data that
are selected, coordinated, or arranged in such a way that the re-
sulting work as a whole constitutes an original work of author-
ship.”172 The Court noted that the focus on selection, coordination,
and arrangement of facts was an application of the originality re-
quirement.173 More importantly, however, Congress had gone on
to require that facts be selected, coordinated, or arranged “in such
a way” that the resulting work is original:
This implies that some “ways” will trigger copyright, but that
others will not. . . . Otherwise, the phrase “in such a way” is
meaningless and Congress should have defined “compilation”
simply as “a work formed by the collection and assembly of pre-
existing materials or data that are selected, coordinated, or ar-
ranged.” That Congress did not do so is dispositive. . . . [W]e
conclude that the statute envisions that there will be some fact-
based works in which the selection, coordination, and arrange-
ment are not sufficiently original to trigger copyright protec-
tion.174
The Court then considered whether Feist had copied anything
original from Rural’s directory. As Rural had already conceded
that the names, addresses, and telephone numbers in its direc-
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169. The Court cited Leon v. Pacific Telephone & Telegraph Co., 91 F.2d 484 (9th Cir.
1937), and Jeweler’s Circular Publishing Co. v. Keystone Publishing Co., 281 F. 83 (2d
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170. Feist, 499 U.S. at 352.
171. Id. at 353.
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tory were “preexisting material”175—in other words, uncopyrigh-
table facts—the question that remained for the Court was
whether Rural had selected, coordinated, or arranged these facts
in an original way. Describing Rural’s work as a “garden-variety
white pages directory,” the Court held that the directory’s selec-
tion and arrangement did not satisfy the minimum standards for
copyright protection.176 Because it published “the most basic in-
formation” about its subscribers, “Rural’s selection of listings
could not be more obvious.”177 Moreover, Rural’s arrangement of
the listings lacked the requisite originality as well:
The white pages do nothing more than list Rural’s subscribers
in alphabetical order. This arrangement may, technically
speaking, owe its origin to Rural; no one disputes that Rural
undertook the task of alphabetizing the names itself. But there
is nothing remotely creative about arranging names alphabeti-
cally in a white pages directory. It is an age-old practice, firmly
rooted in tradition and so commonplace that it has come to be
expected as a matter of course. . . . It is not only unoriginal, it is
practically inevitable. This time-honored tradition does not
possess the minimal creative spark required by the Copyright
Act and the Constitution.178
The Court found that while the Rural directory as a whole was
entitled to copyright protection, the white pages “utterly lack[ed
the] originality” necessary for copyright protection under the
Copyright Act of 1976.179 Feist’s use of the listings could therefore
not constitute infringement, regardless of the effort Rural had
expended in compiling its directory.
3.   Analysis
a.   The Tenability of Mead After Feist
What is perhaps most immediately noticeable about the Mead
opinion when viewed in light of Feist is the Eighth Circuit’s reli-
ance upon another white pages infringement case, Hutchinson
Telephone Co. v. Fronteer Directory ,180 for both a standard for
originality181 and for its proposition that wholesale appropriation
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of factual compilations always constitutes infringement.182
Hutchinson has been called “the most specious of authority” by at
least one post-Feist commentator;183 it is probably more accu-
rately described as having been entirely undermined by Feist.
The Feist Court overruled not only Hutchinson ’s standard for
originality, but also its view of the degree of copyright protection
extended to factual compilations.
Further, in dismissing MDC’s reliance upon Lawyers’ Co-op ,
the Mead court stated that the 1909 decision “requir[ed] a greater
degree of intellectual creativity than the trend of modern
cases.”184 As support for this proposition, the Eighth Circuit cited
Rockford Map Publishers v. Directory Service Co. ,185 a 1985 Sev-
enth Circuit decision. The Rockford Map  court, however, stated
that “copyright depend[s] on the fact that the compiler ma[kes] a
contribution—a new arrangement or presentation of facts.”186 In-
deed, the Rockford Map  court did not even inquire into whether
the “contribution” made by the plaintiff in that case was suffi-
cient to constitute an original work of authorship—an inquiry
that, as the Feist Court pointed out, the Copyright Act man-
dates.187 Ignoring the requirement that facts be “selected, coordi-
nated, or arranged in such a way” that the resulting work is an
original work of authorship, the Rockford Map  court instead
found that the fact of arrangement alone was sufficient to war-
rant copyright protection.188 If this is the “modern trend” against
which the Lawyers’ Co-op  court’s denial of copyright protection to
case reporter pagination stands in contrast, Feist has brought it
to a screeching halt.
The majority opinion in Mead focused an inordinate amount of
attention on the labor West expended in compiling its case re-
porters. West’s arrangement, the court observed, was “the result
of considerable labor, talent, and judgment”;189 and what MDC
was trying to do was give its users “a large part of what West has
                                                                                                             
182. See id. at 1228 (citing Hutchinson, 770 F.2d at 128).
183. Carl J. Khalil, Are Page Numbers Really Copyrightable? The Effect of Feist on the
West Publishing v. LEXIS Case, 76 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 807, 811 (1994).
184. Mead, 799 F.2d at 1226 (citation omitted).
185. 768 F.2d 145 (7th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1061 (1986).
186. Id. at 149. The Rockford Map court relied in part on Jewelers’ Circular Publishing
Co. v. Keystone Publishing Co., 281 F. 83 (2d Cir), cert. denied, 250 U.S. 581 (1922), one of
the two cases the Feist Court used as exemplars of the discredited “sweat of the brow” doc-
trine. See Feist, 499 U.S. at 352 (“[S]ome courts misunderstood the [copyright] statute.”).
187. See Feist, 499 U.S. at 358.
188. Rockford Map, 768 F.2d at 149.
189. Mead, 799 U.S. at 1226.
242 FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 24:217
spent so much labor and industry in compiling.”190 In a similar
vein, Mead concluded that the Supreme Court had not found the
independent use of case reporter page numbers an infringement
in Callaghan because the plaintiff’s “case arrangement and pagi-
nation involved little labor.”191 However, the amount of labor ex-
pended in producing factual compilations is, after Feist, entirely
irrelevant to copyright considerations.
Finally, the Feist Court’s articulation of a threshold require-
ment for originality in factual compilations casts further doubt
upon Mead. Because the Mead court arguably applied a lower
standard for originality than that mandated by Feist, West’s case
arrangement process must be reevaluated in light of the consid-
erations set out in Feist.
Before evaluating West’s arrangement of cases, it is necessary
to remark that the separation of decisions is unquestionably a
process not performed by West. Federal and state court opinions
are not stored in some central repository from which West subse-
quently collects and sorts them out; rather, because West receives
them from both individual federal courts and individual states,
the opinions arrive at West already separated.192
More important, however, is the short shrift that Mead gave to
West’s arrangement process, which would appear to have been a
primary consideration. Because there was no record at trial of
West’s arrangement and pagination process, a look at how the
cases appear on their face in the reporters is both necessary and
enlightening.193
The Southern Reporter  contains the state court opinions of
Alabama, Florida, Louisiana, and Mississippi. Volume 661 of the
Second Series of the Southern Reporter  begins with a group of
opinions from the Florida District Courts of Appeal in chronologi-
cal order.194 Next, the volume reports two decisions of the Louisi-
ana Supreme Court and then a group of opinions of the Louisiana
Circuit Courts of Appeal, all in chronological order.195 The follow-
ing pages contain Mississippi Supreme Court opinions, again in
                                                                                                             
190. Id. at 1227.
191. Id. at 1224.
192. See Khalil, supra note 183, at 817 (“One would imagine that the opinions arrive
already ‘separated’ since they originate from separate courts.”)
193. West would later explain its arrangement process in Oasis Publishing Co., Inc. v.
West Publishing Co., 924 F. Supp. 918 (D. Minn. 1996). See infra note 234 and accompany-
ing text.
194. 661 So. 2d at 19-141. A list of Florida decisions without published opinions occu-
pies the first 18 pages of the volume. See id. at 1-18.
195. See id. at 142-76.
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chronological order.196 The volume then reports decisions of the
Alabama Supreme Court in chronological order,197 followed by
opinions of the Alabama Court of Civil Appeals, also in chrono-
logical order.198 Immediately following, however, are the opinions
of both the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals and the Alabama
Supreme Court for two cases, both of which are reported in the
order of their procedural posture before the Alabama courts and,
as a whole, not in chronological order.199 Next, the volume reports
decisions of the Florida Supreme Court chronologically200 before
beginning again with decisions of the Florida District Courts of
Appeal and repeating the entire pattern described above.201
Within the subsequent jurisdictional case groupings, however,
the reporter often presents additional cases from the same time
periods covered by the earlier jurisdictional case groupings. Nev-
ertheless, the cases within the groupings are reported in chrono-
logical order.
The Second Series of the Federal Reporter  follows a similar
tack. The reporter groups cases chronologically by circuit, using
much the same round robin approach within the volume. In other
words, although cases are grouped by circuit, each circuit fre-
quently has more than one grouping within a volume. Again, al-
though the time frame of a later grouping for a particular circuit
often overlaps with the time frame of an earlier grouping for that
circuit, the cases are nevertheless reported in chronological order
within each grouping.
Two things immediately become clear from the above descrip-
tions. First, West arranges the cases in its reporters by jurisdic-
tion. Second, within each jurisdictional grouping, West arranges
the cases in chronological order. Feist compels the question: Is
there originality in this arrangement of facts?202 Although the
Feist Court reasoned that the originality standard “does not re-
quire that facts be presented in an innovative or surprising way,”
it insisted that “the arrangement of facts cannot be so mechanical
or routine as to require no creativity whatsoever.”203 Arranging
cases chronologically by jurisdiction in a case reporter would
seem to be on a plane with arranging names alphabetically in a
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telephone directory. To report cases one after another in the same
order a court has decided them “is not only unoriginal, it is prac-
tically inevitable.”204 Moreover, if “there is nothing remotely crea-
tive about arranging names alphabetically in a white pages direc-
tory,”205 much the same can be said about arranging cases by
court of origin in a case reporter. The cases simply arrive that
way to begin with. “Arranging” cases by jurisdiction and in
chronological order is a “time-honored tradition [that] does not
possess the minimal creative spark required by the Copyright Act
and the Constitution.”206 Yet even if one assumes that this form of
arrangement comes close to possessing that minimal creative
spark, extending copyright protection beyond the arrangement to
the arrangement’s page numbers—which are, without question,
the result of a rote, mechanized system or process—stretches the
already “thin” copyright in factual arrangements to transparent
absurdity.
b.   Public Policy
Although it is difficult—but not impossible—to fault the Mead
court for its inability to anticipate Feist, the Eighth Circuit deci-
sion nonetheless disregarded a public policy backed by a century
and a half of precedent. Of the cases in the Wheaton line, only
Callaghan had found the use of a case reporter infringing.207 The
defendant in Callaghan did far more than simply appropriate the
plaintiff’s arrangement of cases, however; he pirated the plain-
tiff’s headnotes, statements of cases, and arguments of counsel as
well.208 No court has ever found the appropriation of such mate-
rial from a case reporter to be noninfringing. Yet until Mead, no
court had ever found the mere use of a case reporter’s arrange-
ment and pagination infringing. Both the Callaghan Court and
the Lawyers’ Co-op  court had the chance to do just that; both,
however, declined. From the Callaghan Court’s relative lack of
clarity on the point, the majority in Mead was able to glean that
there was no rule against copyrighting case reporter arrangement
and pagination;209 and from this ostensible absence of the barking
dog, the court fashioned the rule that copyrighting these com-
paratively insignificant elements was indeed permissible in all
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instances save those where positive law effectively compels the
publisher to arrange the cases in a volume.210 The Mead holding
is thus at odds with the current of thought underlying Wheaton
and its progeny. The public policy this line of cases furthers is one
of maximum, unimpeded access to the law,211 not of unimpeded
access to a publisher’s intellectual property.
The Wheaton public policy of not allowing legal publishers to
encumber free access to the law is derived directly from the bal-
ancing of interests embodied in the Copyright Clause of the Con-
stitution and reflected in the Copyright Act of 1976. As Professors
Patterson and Joyce point out, copyright in a work is not meant
to be treated as the proprietary right of an author, but as “the
grant of a closely regulated statutory monopoly.”212 The 1976 Act
balances the monopolistic interests of authors in protecting their
works from wrongful appropriation against the interests of the
public in restricting the monopoly and allowing reasonable access
to the works.213 Mead all but ignored the latter and instead over-
emphasized the former.214
Joyce and Patterson make the implicit argument that the
Mead decision effectively violates the Copyright Clause.215 By ex-
tending copyright protection to the page numbers of legal mate-
rials, the Mead court essentially retarded rather than
“[p]romot[ed] the Progress of [legal] Science”:216
Where a single publisher is the sole compiler of a jurisdiction’s
case reports and statutes, permitting that publisher to control
others’ use of such numbers produces one of two results: either
it impedes more efficient access to the law by restricting the
use of competitors’ developing technologies, as occurred prior to
the settlement in Mead; or it in effect imposes a tax for the use
                                                                                                             
210. See id. at 1226.
211. See Patterson & Joyce, supra note 25, at 742.
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213. Id. at 807.
214. According to Professors Joyce and Patterson, one of the many flaws in the Mead
decision was a conflation of unfair competition and copyright law. See id. at 778. The court
continually focused on the market effects of star pagination—a consideration irrelevant to
a finding of copyrightability and subsequent infringement. See id. at 781.
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of the law, preventing effective price competition by sanctioning
the imposition of license fees on the publisher’s rivals.217
Mead has undoubtedly brought about both results. Competi-
tors who seek to release, say, federal court decisions on CD-ROM
will only do so if the bar finds the product useful (and hence
profitable to the publishing company). The threat of a West law-
suit, however, precludes competitors from providing the bar and
the public in general with ready, cost-efficient access to the law.218
The only remaining alternative for competitors who wish to avoid
litigation is to enter into a licensing and royalty agreement with
West.219 West thus exerts a quasi-monopolistic control over access
to the law, charging prohibitively expensive fees and intimidating
competitors into either acquiescing or simply refraining from
publishing the law. To a great degree, then, legal science ends up
being held hostage—in direct contravention of the Constitution.
Finally, the Eighth Circuit’s decision glossed over the extent to
which West has become a de facto—and, in at least one state, de
jure220—official reporter in numerous jurisdictions. In so doing,
the court took a narrow, laissez-faire view of the state of legal
publishing in this country. Unless West were bound by statutory
duties to produce a volume of cases, the court reasoned, it was
entirely free to cloak the law it reported in a questionable form of
intellectual property, namely page numbers.221 This view only
sanctions monopolistic behavior on the part of legal publishers. If,
indeed, West were the only publisher of case reporters in the
United States, the Eighth Circuit’s reasoning would entitle West
to safeguard its case reporter pagination and effectively control
access to the law. Moreover, when the court held that notwith-
standing West’s possibly official status, its arrangement and
pagination were nevertheless sufficient to warrant copyright pro-
tection,222 it undercut its own analysis of Lawyers’ Co-op . If, as
the Mead court found, the denial of copyright protection to case
arrangement and pagination in Lawyers’ Co-op  turned upon the
reporter’s official status,223 then regardless of whatever judgment
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or discretion West exercised in its arrangement of cases, its offi-
cial status precluded copyright protection for those elements.
B.   Mead Revisited: A Failed Attempt to Free Florida Law
Ten years after the Mead decision, West still finds itself in-
volved in litigation over its claimed copyright to the internal
pagination of its case reporters. In February 1994, Matthew
Bender & Co., Inc. filed suit against West, seeking a declaratory
judgment that West does not possess a federal copyright in the
internal pagination of its case reporters and that therefore the
use of West’s pagination in Bender’s CD-ROM of New York cases
would be noninfringing.224 The Manhattan federal district court
denied West’s motion to dismiss in May 1996.225 The Bender liti-
gation was still ongoing as of August 1996. Nevertheless, West
did score an important victory in May 1996 when the same Min-
nesota federal district court that decided Mead granted West
partial summary judgment in an action filed by a CD-ROM pub-
lisher seeking to include West’s pagination on a CD-ROM of
Florida case law.226
Oasis Publishing Co., Inc. originally brought suit against West
in the Southern District of Florida, alleging, among other things,
that West’s refusal to allow the use of the Southern Reporter ’s
pagination on Oasis’s proposed CD-ROM of Florida cases violated
“various Florida public records statutes.”227 In addition, Oasis
sought a declaratory judgment that West has no federal copyright
in the page numbers of the Southern Reporter , that any use of the
page numbers by Oasis would be noninfringing, and that “Florida
public records law makes unenforceable any copyright in the page
numbers in the Southern Reporter .”228 West moved to dismiss and
to transfer the case to Minnesota; the court, without ruling on the
motion to dismiss, granted the motion to transfer the case.229
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The Minnesota federal district court first addressed the overall
question of whether West could copyright the internal pagination
of any of its case reporters. The court immediately disposed of
Oasis’s contention that Feist had overruled Mead: “[T]he [Mead
court] applied essentially the same creativity standard discussed
and applied in Feist. . . . Feist did not overrule Mead.”230 The court
stated that even if Mead had not applied the appropriate stan-
dard of originality, “its analysis demonstrates that West’s ar-
rangement in that case easily satisfied the ‘modicum of creativity’
later emphasized repeatedly by the Supreme Court in Feist.”231
 Unlike Mead, the district court in Oasis had more facts in the
record on which to base a determination of creativity in the ar-
rangement of cases.232 After noting West’s division of cases by
state and court level,233 the court explained that West then di-
vides opinions within each state and court level “and arranges
them by placing first the fully headnoted opinions and jacketed
memoranda, next sheet memoranda, and finally table disposi-
tions.”234 Attorney-editors at West decide which cases deserve
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233. Id. As in Mead, the court’s depiction of West as actively “divid[ing] the cases by
state” apparently overlooked the fact that the opinions arrive already separated by state.
See supra note 192 and accompanying text.
234. Oasis, 924 F. Supp. at 924. West had stipulated as to the arrangement of the
Southern Reporter as follows:
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randums” by West because West provides them with a separate case folder
“jacket”), consecutively[ ]issued memorandum dispositions (such as a batch of
review-denied or appeal-denied decisions by a state appellate court) and then
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peals of Alabama; Court of Criminal Appeals of Alabama; Supreme Court of
Florida; Court of Appeals of Florida; Supreme Court of Louisiana; Court of Ap-
peals of Louisiana; Supreme Court of Mississippi.
Within each jurisdiction, reports of opinions and jacketed memorandum de-
cisions come first and within that grouping, are arranged in filing date order.
Other memorandum case reports, if any, are grouped together and come next.
Tables of dispositions, if any, generally are coordinated and arranged next.
In addition to this general arrangement, West has a procedure whereby it
links two or more case reports together in a “precede and follow” arrangement
which overrides any general arrangement rule that would otherwise split the
two case reports.
In Southern Reporter, all cases from the Florida Supreme Court precede
cases from the Florida Appellate Courts. Within each court division the cases
are ordered by case type: Florida Supreme Court opinions precede Florida Su-
preme Court memorand[a] which precede Florida Supreme Court unpublished
opinion tables, which precede the Florida district court opinions (Fla. App. 1st
Dist., Fla. App. 2[d] Dist., etc.).
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headnotes and, based upon the subject matter of the decisions,
override West’s general arrangement guidelines in approximately
twenty-five percent of the cases.235 Finding that no other pub-
lisher followed West’s arrangement, and that the arrangement
“require[d] far more than rote chronological or jurisdictional se-
quencing,” the court held that West’s arrangement “easily” satis-
fied the requirements of Feist.236
The court then quickly dismissed the argument that even if
West’s arrangement were protected by copyright, such protection
did not extend to pagination.237 Oasis contended that the pagina-
tion of each case was simply a system or process devoid of creativ-
ity and, therefore, could not be copyrighted.238 In response, the
court pointed out that the Mead court had rejected the same ar-
gument.239 Calling pagination “an integral part” of West’s ar-
rangement, the court held that it was an original work of author-
ship entitled to copyright protection.240
Oasis also argued that because West had conceded that cita-
tion to the first page of each case within its volumes was a nonin-
fringing fair use, any copyright protection in West’s internal
pagination was diminished because the initial page numbers al-
ready revealed West’s arrangement of cases.241 The court re-
sponded by pointing out that West’s concession did not authorize
others to copy every page citation.242 Moreover, the court contin-
ued, even if one could determine West’s arrangement from the
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Id. (citations omitted).
236. Id. at 924-25.
237. See id. at 925.
238. Id.
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Callaghan, see supra text accompanying note 45, without mentioning the Callaghan
Court’s approving quotation of the lower court’s countervailing language, see supra text
accompanying note 47.
241. Oasis, 924 F. Supp. at 926.
242. Id.
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initial page citations, their use, unlike that of the internal page
citations, did not obviate the need to buy West’s reporters.243
After weighing and dismissing Oasis’s contention that its pro-
posed star pagination to the Southern Reporter  was a fair use,244
the court then addressed the question of whether West’s alleged
status as Florida’s official reporter precluded copyright in the
page numbers of the Southern Reporter .245 In 1948, Florida had
ceased publishing its own official reporter, Florida Reports , and
had adopted the Southern Reporter  as the state’s official publica-
tion of state court opinions.246 The following year, West began
publishing Florida Cases , a version of the Southern Reporter  with
non-Florida cases omitted, yet with the same pagination as the
Southern Reporter .247
Although West allows others to freely star paginate to volumes
that it publishes as a state’s official reporter, it denied that it was
the official reporter for Florida.248 Oasis contended that the oppo-
site was true, however, because section 25.381, Florida Statutes
explicitly directed the Florida Supreme Court and Florida’s At-
torney General to enter biannually into a contract with West
providing for the publication and distribution of Florida Cases .249
Moreover, Oasis argued that West had “acquiesce[d]” in Florida’s
view of West as the state’s official reporter and that the following
notice issued by the Florida Supreme Court and published by
West in the Southern Reporter  supported its position:
The SOUTHERN REPORTER, beginning with 1948 Florida
Supreme Court cases reported in 37 So.2d 692 et seq., is
adopted by the Supreme Court of Florida, and by the Board of
Commissioners of State Institutions of Florida as the official
publication of the opinions and decisions of the Supreme Court
of Florida. This book connects with Volume 160 Florida Re-
ports, without omission or duplication.
Citations should be to Southern Reporter volume and page
thus: 42 So.2d 368
[signed]
Alto Adams
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245. Id. at 929-30. Oasis actually argued that Florida Cases—the West-published vol-
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Chief Justice250
The Oasis court stated its reluctance to “mark the legal rela-
tionship between the State of Florida and West” and noted that
the facts of the case did not require it to do so.251 The copyright
interest at issue, the court went on, did not involve the opinions
of Florida’s courts per se, but rather West’s arrangement of those
opinions.252 The court reasoned that even if West were the official
reporter of Florida, the state had given its “express consent” to
the contractual clause allowing West to keep its copyright in the
arrangement of cases.253 Since 1957, Florida’s contract with West
had acknowledged West’s copyright interest in the syllabi and
other material original to West; immediately after the Mead de-
cision, the contract was revised to include language covering
West’s arrangement.254 The court found that the “undisputed evi-
dence” showed that Florida had “freely acquiesced to the added
language.”255
Finally, as to Oasis’s claim that the pagination of Florida
Cases was freely copyable because Florida Cases  is a public rec-
ord subject to Florida’s Public Records Act,256 the court adopted
West’s counterargument in response. The Florida Supreme Court
had already held that the Public Records Act did not apply to ju-
dicial records;257 further, even if the Public Records Act did apply,
allowing it to negate West’s copyright interest would violate the
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FLORIDA CASES, are subject to copyright and will be copyrighted by the FIRST PARTY.”
254. Oasis, 924 F. Supp. at 930-31.
255. Id. at 931.
256. See FLA. STAT. § 119.01 (“[A]ll state, county, and municipal records shall be open
for personal inspection by any person.”).
257. Oasis, 924 F. Supp. at 931 (citing Times Publishing Co. v. Ake, 660 So. 2d 255
(Fla. 1995)). Oddly enough, the court did not address Oasis’s claim that Florida Cases is a
public record subject to the Florida Constitution, which provides that: 
Every person has the right to inspect or copy any public record made or re-
ceived in connection with the official business of any public body, officer, or
employee of the state, or persons acting on their behalf . . . . This section spe-
cifically includes the legislative, executive, and judicial branches of govern-
ment and each agency or department created thereunder . . . .
FLA. CONST. art. I, § 24(a) (emphasis added). Admittedly, this would still have raised the
Supremacy Clause problem the court discussed. In addition, the agreement between West
and Florida, while ostensibly violative of the Florida Constitution, is nonetheless a valid
contract. See infra text accompanying notes 258-59.
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Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution.258 Moreover, the court
added, even assuming the absence of any constitutional difficulty,
Florida’s contract with West had expressly reserved in West the
copyright in the arrangement of cases.259
The Oasis court’s finding that Feist did not overrule Mead is
not surprising. While Feist arguably overruled Mead implicitly, it
certainly did not do so expressly. Thus, the district court, being a
part of the Eighth Circuit, understandably felt bound to view
Mead as still constituting good law.260 However, the court’s os-
tensibly blind adherence to Mead simply points out that the rea-
soning in Mead has led to bad public policy. The issue is not the
arrangement of cases. No publisher is interested in duplicating
West’s arrangement case-by-case. Even granting that West’s ar-
rangement process is sufficiently original to satisfy Feist, other
legal publishers are hardly champing at the bit to mimic that
process by presenting cases in the precise manner West publishes
them in its reporters. Rather, the issue is whether West’s pagi-
nation is sufficiently original to satisfy Feist.
While the district court in Oasis found that pagination was “an
integral part” of West’s arrangement,261 the court was far too
quick to dismiss Oasis’s argument that extending West’s copy-
right interest beyond its arrangement of cases to pagination gave
West copyright in a system.262 As one of West’s experts had affi-
anced, West’s pagination “is a system of citation.”263 The Copy-
right Act expressly precludes copyright protection in “any idea,
procedure, process, system, method of operation, concept, princi-
ple, or discovery, regardless of the form in which it is described,
explained, illustrated, or embodied in such work.”264 The form in
which West’s system of pagination is embodied happens to be
West’s arrangement of cases. The Oasis court, however, found
that the system was an integral part of the arrangement.265 Thus,
the court should have balanced the prohibition against copyright-
ing systems with the extent of West’s copyright interest in its ar-
rangement of cases. This balancing would necessitate in turn
                                                                                                             
258. Oasis, 924 F. Supp. at 931.
259. Id.
260. See Transcript of Oral Argument at 51 (“I suspect . . . I’m simply a whistle stop on
the way to the Circuit.”).
261. Oasis, 924 F. Supp. at 925; see also West Publishing Co. v. Mead Data Cent., Inc.,
799 F.2d 1219, 1227 (8th Cir. 1986) (finding internal pagination “an important part” of
West’s arrangement”).
262. See Oasis, 924 F. Supp. at 925.
263. Transcript of Oral Argument at 25 (quoting Prof. Robert Berring).
264. 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1994).
265. Oasis, 924 F. Supp. at 925.
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weighing public policy ramifications; and, because the courts of
this country generally require that parties who seek resolution of
cases and controversies use West’s pagination, public policy
would seem to dictate that the line of copyright protection be
drawn to exclude such pagination. This is a view entirely consis-
tent with Wheaton and its progeny.266 Nevertheless, both Oasis
and Mead eschewed any public policy analysis and found that the
mere possibility of market harm to West was sufficient to war-
rant extending copyright protection to West’s pagination.267 Mar-
ket harm, however, while relevant to considerations of fair use,
has no bearing on whether there is a copyright interest in the
first place.268
The holdings in Mead and Oasis should serve as a wake-up
call to states such as Florida. Implicit in the Oasis court’s contin-
ual reiteration of Florida’s “express consent” in allowing the
copyright interest in the arrangement of Florida Cases  to remain
with West is the observation that Florida has effectively duped
itself. Other states for whom West publishes official reports have
required West to give up its copyright in the arrangements of
cases in those official reports.269 In discontinuing its own official
reporter, however, and in denominating as official—solely in its
own eyes, apparently—the Florida-only version of the Southern
Reporter entitled Florida Cases , Florida has lost control over the
citation system for “what the law is” in Florida.270 The contract
between West and Florida, which gives West control over the ar-
rangement of the opinions reported in Florida Cases , limits ac-
cess to the most important public records of the Florida judici-
ary—the law itself—and arguably violates the public records
                                                                                                             
266. See supra discussion part II.A.1-3.
267. West Publishing Co. v. Mead Data Cent., Inc., 799 F.2d 1219, 1228 (8th Cir.
1986); Oasis, 924 F. Supp. at 926.
268. See Patterson & Joyce, supra note 25, at 781 (observing that it is improper “to re-
sort to the market effect of an infringer’s conduct . . . to determine initially whether there
was copyright protection and therefore infringement”).
269. Transcript of Oral Argument at 43, Oasis, (No. 3-95-563) (“The contract between
West and Ohio specifically states that the arrangement of the Ohio official reports shall be
in the public domain. By contract, the state required West to give up the copyright and
West did so.”).
270. By eliminating the official Florida Reports in 1948, Florida did eliminate the prob-
lem of parallel citations to both the Florida Reports and the Southern Reporter. Where a state
has an official reporter, such as the erstwhile Florida Reports, The Bluebook requires that
documents submitted to the courts of that state contain citations to both the official reporter
and the West regional reporter. See, e.g., The Bluebook: A Uniform System of Citation 202
(15th ed. 1991) (“In documents submitted to Ohio state courts, cite to Ohio St., Ohio St. 2d,
Ohio St. 3d, or Ohio, if therein, and to N.E. or N.E.2d if therein.”).
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provision of the Florida Constitution, which specifically includes
the judiciary.271 In effect, West owns Florida’s law.272
C.   The “Crown Jewels”: Electronic Case Law Databases on the
Internet
West Publishing Company has not only zealously safeguarded
its interest in the page numbers of its reporters, it has also
sought to prevent public access to electronic case law databases
originally created by the government. In 1963, the U.S. Air Force
created Finding Legal Information Through Electronics (FLITE),
an electronic database of legal materials containing, among other
things, all United States Supreme Court decisions dating back to
1937.273 In 1971, the Department of Justice (DOJ) created an elec-
tronic database called the Justice Retrieval and Inquiry System
(JURIS), which inherited the Supreme Court decisions from
FLITE, and which came to contain a complete collection of federal
case law dating back, in some instances, to 1789.274 JURIS al-
lowed DOJ attorneys to conduct research and also provided a
citing service similar to Shepard’s.275 Access to JURIS was limited
to DOJ attorneys and federal and state agencies that subscribed
through a reimbursement agreement with DOJ.276 In 1983, DOJ
decided to contract the data entry and management for JURIS
out to a private vendor: West Publishing Company.277 Unfortu-
nately, the DOJ contract allowed West to remove from JURIS the
case law West had input should West ever choose not to renew
the contract.278 In 1993, in response to a petition submitted to At-
torney General Janet Reno by information activist James Love
seeking general public access to JURIS, West decided not to re-
                                                                                                             
271. See FLA. CONST. art. I, § 24(a); see also supra note 257.
272. While the Florida Supreme Court has apparently relaxed its citation require-
ments by only “preferr[ing]” pinpoint citation to the Southern Reporter, see FLA. R. APP. P.
9.800(n), as counsel for Oasis pointed out during oral argument, “when a court expresses
to counsel a practice in the Bar before it, that . . . it would prefer something be done in a
certain way, well, by golly, that is the way the lawyer is going to do it.” Transcript of Oral
Argument at 34, Oasis, (No. 3-95-563).
273. See James Love, Supreme Court Decisions in FLITE Database, Dec. 22, 1995, In-
ternet listserv posting available at http://www.essential.org/listproc/tap-juris/0178.html
(Aug. 16, 1996) (copy on file with the author).
274. Gary Wolf, Who Owns the Law?, WIRED, May 1994, at 98; John J. Oslund, Debate
Rages Over Who Owns the Law, MINN. STAR-TRIB., Mar. 6, 1995, at A8.
275. Tax Analysts v. Department of Justice, 913 F. Supp. 599, 601 (D.D.C. 1996).
276. Id.
277. Wolf, supra note 274, at 100. As Gary Wolf notes, this was “a move consistent
with the Reagan-era emphasis of privatization.” Id.
278. Id.
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new its contract and removed the case law it had input.279 Lack-
ing the budget to re-enter the data from the ten years West had
control over JURIS, DOJ shut the system down.280
Although JURIS is no longer active, DOJ has not yet erased
the case law comprising the JURIS database.281 A nonprofit or-
ganization named Tax Analysts, which had also submitted a
Freedom of Information Act (FOIA)282 request for the JURIS da-
tabase in 1993, brought suit in federal district court in 1994
seeking to compel release of JURIS under FOIA.283 West inter-
vened as of right in the action because of its substantial interest
in JURIS.284 The district court granted DOJ’s partial motion to
dismiss and West’s motion to dismiss, finding that JURIS was
not an “agency record” within the meaning of FOIA.285
The district court’s decision, relying as it did upon Mead for
part of its reasoning,286 seems open to question. The court, in
commenting upon the contract between DOJ and West, found
that West was not attempting to license data in the public do-
main, but rather its electronic compilation  of data in the public
domain.287 Without any discussion of the originality requirement
mandated by Feist, the court held that by “electronically for-
mat[ting]” case law, West was “legally entitled” to license the
data in JURIS.288 The court stated that “[m]aking data ‘readable’ .
. . takes considerable time and effort.”289 Of course, Feist makes
considerations of time and effort expended irrelevant to a finding
                                                                                                             
279. Id.
280. Id.
281. Id. at 100-01.
282. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1994).
283. Tax Analysts v. Department of Justice, 913 F. Supp. 599, 600-01 (D.D.C. 1996).
284. Id. at 601.
285. Id. The district court found that the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Department
of Justice v. Tax Analysts, 492 U.S. 136 (1989), did not provide adequate guidance as to
what constituted agency “control” of a document. 913 F. Supp. at 602. “Agency records” are
documents which are (1) created or obtained by the agency, and (2) under agency control at
the time of the FOIA request. 492 U.S. at 144-45. Although the Supreme Court specifically
defined “control” as meaning “that the materials have come into the agency’s possession in
the legitimate conduct of its official duties,” id. at 145, the district court de-emphasized
this definition and instead insisted that possession alone does not determine control. See
913 F. Supp. at 603. The district court thus disregarded the Supreme Court’s instruction
to consider not possession alone, but whether the agency took possession of the materials
in the “legitimate conduct” of its official duties.
286. See Tax Analysts, 913 F. Supp. at 605 (citing West Publishing Co. v. Mead Data
Cent., Inc., 616 F. Supp. 1571, 1577 (D. Minn. 1985), aff’d, 799 F.2d 1219 (8th Cir. 1986),
cert.  denied, 479 U.S. 1070 (1987)).
287. Id.
288. Id.
289. Id.
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of copyrightability.290 Further, the proper inquiry is whether the
process of “electronically formatting” case law possesses the
minimal degree of creativity to satisfy the Copyright Act’s origi-
nality requirement.291 Inputting text to make it readable by DOJ’s
computer system, regardless of the particular quirks of JURIS, is
simply a rote, mechanized process devoid of creativity. The
Copyright Act specifically excludes mechanical processes from
copyrightability.292
Regardless of the district court’s ruling, a number of individu-
als and organizations are continuing their press to make the elec-
tronic case law databases commissioned by the government ac-
cessible to the general public. Taxpayers Asset Project (TAP), a
public interest group headed by James Love, has dubbed the ef-
fort to release the electronic case law databases “the Crown Jew-
els” campaign.293 In addition to supporting Tax Analysts’ push to
have DOJ release JURIS to the public, TAP is particularly inter-
ested in gaining access to the almost sixty years of U.S. Supreme
Court opinions contained in the FLITE database.294 Unlike
JURIS, FLITE contains no copyrightable materials and was de-
veloped entirely at taxpayer expense.295 The Clinton Administra-
tion, apparently lobbied hard by West, has claimed that it does
not have to release the records contained in the FLITE database
because it views them as “library” materials.296 A federal district
court in California agreed with the Clinton Administration in
1995, finding that the definition of “records” in the Records Dis-
posal Act297—which was in effect at the same time Congress
passed the FOIA—specifically excluded library reference materi-
als.298 Because such materials are used for reference or research
purposes, the court reasoned, “the indicia of control are lack-
ing.”299
Although the lower federal courts have dealt the information
activists a setback, it would seem to be only a matter of time be-
                                                                                                             
290. 499 U.S. at 353-54.
291. Id. at 358-59.
292. See 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1994) (“In no case does copyright protection for an original
work of authorship extend to any idea, procedure, process, system, method of operation,
concept, principle, or discovery, regardless of the form in which it is described, explained,
illustrated, or embodied in such work.”).
293. See Love, supra note 263.
294. Id.
 295. Id.
296. Id.
297. 44 U.S.C. § 3301 (1994).
298. Baizer v. Department of the Air Force, 887 F. Supp 225, 229 (N.D. Cal. 1995).
299. Id. at 228.
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fore an archive of older federal case law is made available on the
Internet. Either a higher federal court will recognize that public
access to the taxpayer-subsidized JURIS and FLITE databases is
solidly within the public policy embodied in both the FOIA and
the Wheaton line of cases, or technology will eventually allow
relatively painless electronic scanning of older court decisions
and their subsequent placement on the Internet.300
However, even though Feist and subsequent lower court deci-
sions301 have made it clear that the copyright interest in factual
compilation databases is highly limited, West and other commer-
cial interests are pushing for congressional passage of H.R. 3531,
the Database Investment and Intellectual Property Antipiracy
Act of 1996.302 The Act would in a sense overrule Feist by granting
protection to databases303 that are “the result of a qualitatively or
quantitatively substantial investment of human, technical, fi-
nancial or other resources in the collection, assembly, verifica-
tion, organization or presentation of the database contents . . .
.”304 In other words, the Act would afford database producers the
“sweat of the brow” protection Feist read out of the Copyright
Act.305 The Act creates a cause of action against anyone who uses
“all or a substantial part” of a protected database’s contents “in a
manner that conflicts with the database owner’s normal exploi-
tation of the database or adversely affects the actual or potential
                                                                                                             
300. Although the proposed National Information Infrastructure Copyright Protection
Act now pending before Congress would prohibit such activity, see H.R. 2441, 104th Cong.,
1st Sess. § 2 (1995), there is nothing in the Copyright Act that prevents a WESTLAW user
from systematically downloading opinions from WESTLAW, stripping out the West syllabi,
headnotes, and page numbers, and creating a publicly accessible case law database.
WESTLAW’s subscriber agreement, however, does prohibit the practice. Nevertheless,
small CD-ROM publishers have attempted to accomplish much the same thing by elec-
tronically scanning cases from West’s print reporters. See West Publishing Co. v. On Point
Solutions, Inc., No. 93-CV2071MHS, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20040 (N.D. Ga. Sept. 1,
1994).
301. See, e.g., BellSouth Advertising & Publishing Corp. v. Donnelley Info. Publishing,
Inc., 999 F.2d 1436, 1438-39, 1444 (11th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 943 (1994)
(finding that extraction of all listings from yellow pages directory for use in competing di-
rectory was permissible); ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 908 F. Supp. 640, 647-48 (W.D. Wis.
1996) (finding no copyright infringement where user downloaded telephone listings from
publisher’s CD-ROM and made listings available on Internet).
302. H.R. 3531, 104th Cong., 2d Sess. (1996); see also IIA Praises Introduction of Data-
base Protection Measure, P.R. NEWSWIRE, May 30, 1996, available in LEXIS, News Li-
brary, Curnws File.
303. The Act uses the term “database” to mean not just electronic databases, but
rather any “collection, assembly or compilation, in any form or medium now or later known
or developed, of works, data or other materials, arranged in a systematic or methodical
way.” H.R. 3531, 104th Cong., 2d Sess. § 2 (1996) (emphasis added).
304. Id. § 3(a).
305. See Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., Inc., 499 U.S. 340, 354 (1991).
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market for the database.”306 A database owner may also bring an
action against anyone who “engage[s] . . . in the repeated or sys-
tematic extraction, use or reuse of insubstantial parts” of a pro-
tected database’s contents.307 Moreover, the Act also provides for
criminal penalties against those who violate the Act “for direct or
indirect commercial advantage or financial gain” or whose viola-
tion of the Act “causes loss or damage to a database owner aggre-
gating $10,000 or more in any one-year calendar period.”308
Because of West’s ostensible “substantial interest” in JURIS,
the Act would seem to allow West to sue those who used the
opinions in JURIS to create their own electronic database. Fur-
thermore, the Act, along with the equally pro-publisher (and anti-
public interest) National Information Infrastructure Copyright
Protection Act of 1995,309 would make it impossible for anyone to
electronically scan a West-published opinion into a computer,
delete West’s proprietary material, and publish the raw opinion.
Because many older opinions are only found in West reporters,
there is generally no other way for a case law database publisher
to provide these older opinions. West would thus remain the sole
proprietor of a substantial portion of the law in this country.
Yet even absent this legislative agenda, the problem of star
pagination would still remain. Most of the opinions in JURIS con-
tain star pagination to West reporters.310 Unless West finds itself
caught up in a sudden fit of altruism and places its page numbers
in the public domain—or unless ongoing litigation seeking to
have West’s page numbers declared uncopyrightable is success-
ful311—the older opinions, much like the new opinions which law
libraries are placing on the Internet, will be of limited use.
                                                                                                             
306. H.R. 3531, 104th Cong., 2d Sess. § 4(a)(1) (1996).
307. Id. § 4(a)(2).
308. Id. § 8(a).
309. H.R. 2441, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995). The proposed legislation would make it a
civil violation for anyone to place copyrighted material into a computer’s random access
memory (RAM) without permission of the copyright owner. See id. § 2(a) (adding “by
transmission” to copyright owner’s exclusive distribution right); id. § 2(a)(B)(2) (adding to
definition of “transmit” additional definition that “to ‘transmit’ a reproduction is to distrib-
ute it by any device or process whereby a copy or phonorecord of the work is fixed beyond
the place from which it was sent”).
310. See Tax Analysts v. Department of Justice, 913 F. Supp. 599, 601 (D.D.C. 1996).
The opinions from the ten-year span during which West had been inputting data contain
West’s headnotes as well, which are undeniably the publisher’s intellectual property. Id.
311. See Matthew Bender & Co., Inc. v. West Publishing Co., No. 94 Civ. 0589, 1996
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5871 (S.D.N.Y. May 2, 1996) (denying West’s motion to dismiss); Mat-
thew Bender & Co., Inc. v. West Publishing Co., No. 94 Civ. 0589, 1995 U.S. Dist LEXIS
17688 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 22, 1995) (granting Bender permission to file a second supplemental
complaint); see also supra discussion part III.B.
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IV.   THE UNIVERSAL CITATION SYSTEM
It would be a mistake to think that just because a certain
kind of judicial business has always been conducted in a par-
ticular way in the past, it therefore ought to be conducted that
way in the future. The federal courts, like other governmental
institutions, must, where necessary, change with the changing
times.312
Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist
Notwithstanding the ongoing debate over pagination copy-
right, the placement on the Internet of all federal circuit court
decisions313 and decisions from a significant number of state
courts has led some to question whether a citation system tied to
the print medium (let alone tied to a single vendor in that me-
dium) is desirable. For even if West’s page numbers became
freely available for all to use as they see fit, the Internet and CD-
ROM purveyors of court opinions would still have to wait at least
until the arrival of West’s advance sheets before being able to in-
sert star pagination to the West reporters. Moreover, star pagi-
nation is an overly time-consuming process. Thus, the work in-
volved in inserting page numbers in court opinions would seem
considerably more than one could expect from the public-spirited
yet shallow-pocketed law libraries now placing opinions on the
World Wide Web. Together with legal CD-ROM publishers, the
law libraries retrieve opinions from court bulletin board systems
(BBSs). Aside from a case name and docket number, there is
usually nothing to identify these cases.
A.   Toward the Wisconsin Proposal
Aware that the federal court opinions available for download-
ing from court BBSs were of little use to practitioners without a
proper form of citation, the Library Program Subcommittee of the
United States Judicial Conference Committee on Automation and
Technology issued a report in 1991 proposing the development of
                                                                                                             
312. Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, Remarks at the Washington College of Law
Centennial Celebration (Apr. 9, 1996).
313. Ironically, the Eighth Circuit completed the array of U.S. Courts of Appeals on
the World Wide Web when the Washington University School of Law in St. Louis began
placing Eighth Circuit decisions on-line in January 1996. See United States Court of Appeals
for the Eighth Circuit, available at http://www.wulaw.wustl.edu/8th.cir/ (Aug. 16, 1996).
260 FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 24:217
a parallel electronic citation system.314 The committee recom-
mended the use of the following citation form:
Smith v. Jones, 1990 FED App. 0322P (5th Cir.)
In this citation, “1990” is the year of the opinion, “0322” desig-
nates the opinion as the 322d issued during 1990, and “P” indi-
cates that the opinion is published.315 The proposed citation form
would have been used as a temporary measure until the citation
to the West reporter became available.316 During the September
1991 hearings on the proposal, both West Chief Executive Officer
Dwight Opperman and Chief Judge Gerald B. Tjoflat of the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit testified against
adopting the new citation system, claiming it would lead to in-
creased court work loads.317 West lobbied hard against the plan,
sending to law librarians information booklets that warned of
dire consequences and voicing to individual federal judges its op-
position.318 In 1992, the Judicial Conference declined to mandate
the proposal, yet left the individual circuits free to experiment
with the system.319
The Sixth Circuit decided to adopt the new citation system in
January 1994.320 Apparently, the increased work load feared by
some in the federal judiciary has yet to materialize. Inserting slip
opinion page numbers or sequential case identification numbers
                                                                                                             
314. WIS. STATE BAR TECH’Y RESOURCE COMM., PROPOSED CITATION SYSTEM FOR WISCONSIN
11 (1994), available at http://www.law.cornell.edu/papers/wiscite/wiscite.overview.html (Aug. 16,
1996) [hereinafter WIS. CITATION REPORT].
315. AMERICAN ASS’N OF L. LIBR., REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE ON CITATION FORMATS ¶
46 (1995), available at http://lawlib.wuacc.edu/aallnet/citeform.html (Aug. 16, 1996)
[hereinafter AALL CITATION REPORT].
 316. Id.
317. Hansen, supra note 5, at 78; Tom Hamburger & Sharon Schmickle, High
Stakes and Hot Competition; In Face of Change, West Publishing Fights to Maintain Its
Lead in Legal Publishing, MINN. STAR-TRIB., Mar. 6, 1995, at 1A. Judge Tjoflat testified
that “it’s simply that we have lots to do, and we don’t want to have any red tape in what
we do.” Hamburger & Schmickle, supra. He later clarified: “I don’t want anything to be
imposed on the federal judiciary that would require . . . one more whit of work.” Han-
sen, supra note 5, at 78.
A number of commentators have remarked upon the appearance of impropriety engen-
dered by federal judges accepting perquisites from West. West, in addition to giving federal
judges personally inscribed calendars, free books, and even bound collections of a particu-
lar judge’s opinions, sponsors the Edward J. Devitt Distinguished Service Award. Id. An
independent panel of federal judges hands out the award, which honors a different mem-
ber of the federal judiciary every year with a $15,000 cash prize and a crystal obelisk. Id.
Each year, West flies members of the panel, at West’s expense, to such destinations as
Palm Springs, the Virgin Islands, Palm Beach, Naples, Florida, and Bel Air, California.
See Hamburger & Schmickle, supra.
318. Hansen, supra note 5, at 78.
319. AALL CITATION REPORT, supra note 315, ¶ 46.
320. See id. ¶ 46 n.63.
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into the electronic opinions available on the circuit’s BBS has
added little to the work of the court.321 Chief Judge Gilbert Mer-
ritt has remarked that the new citation system “just makes [an
electronic opinion] more usable. It’s not any great big deal.”322
However, the Sixth Circuit’s citation system serves only to fill the
gap between release of opinions on the court’s BBS and their final
publication in the West reporter.323 Thus, the citation form is only
final for unpublished opinions.
At about the same time that the Sixth Circuit adopted its new
citation system, the Supreme Court of Louisiana ordered all
Louisiana appellate courts to begin using a “uniform public do-
main citation form” along with a parallel citation to West’s
Southern Reporter .324 The Louisiana system dispenses with the
idea of adding sequential case identification numbers, and uses
docket numbers instead.325 For pinpoint citations, the Louisiana
citation system uses slip opinion page numbers; pinpoint cita-
tions to the Southern Reporter  are optional.326 Thus, a pinpoint ci-
tation to a Louisiana case looks as follows:
Smith v. Jones, 93-2345, p. 7 (La. 7/15/94); 650 So. 2d 500
Unlike the Sixth Circuit’s citation system, however, the Louisi-
ana citation form is final.327 Thus, its effects on legal publishing
have been measurable. Prior to the adoption of the new citation
form, Louisiana court opinions were available only in the South-
ern Reporter, WESTLAW, LEXIS, and on West’s Louisiana Cases
CD-ROM.328 The new citation form allowed two new CD-ROM
products containing Louisiana court opinions to appear on the
market.329 Neither of the two companies marketing the new CD-
ROMs are licensed to use West’s page numbers.330 Moreover, not
only has the Louisiana Supreme Court’s order encouraged com-
petition in the legal publishing arena, it has led to a “considerable
lowering of prices” as well.331
                                                                                                             
321. Hansen, supra note 5, at 78.
322. Id.
323. See AALL CITATION REPORT, supra note 315, ¶ 47.
324. LA. SUP. CT. GEN. ADMIN. R. Part G, § 8.
325. Id. In addition, instead of just the year, the citation form indicates the month and
day of issue. Id.
326. Id.
327. See AALL CITATION REPORT, supra note 315, ¶ 50.
328. Id. ¶ 49.
329. Id.
330. Id.
331. Id. (quoting Thorne D. Harris III, CD-ROMs—The New Basic Research Tool, LA.
B.J., Dec. 1994, at 381).
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Both the Louisiana and the Sixth Circuit moves, forward-
looking as they may seem, are at best only half measures.332 For
in retaining the use of slip opinion page numbers, the two juris-
dictions ignored the fact that page numbers are a convention ill-
suited to electronic publication. Although slip opinion page num-
bers are obviously available much sooner than case reporter page
numbers, page breaks in the word processing files courts use shift
when the user selects a different typeface, changes the margins,
or has a printer different from that of the disseminating court.333
The traditional solution to such difficulties—star pagination—is
cumbersome and time-consuming.334 Apparently aware of this in-
convenience, the Colorado Supreme Court authorized both the
use of and pinpoint citation to paragraph numbers in all Colorado
decisions beginning in May 1994.335 Nevertheless, the Colorado
court retained the use of West’s Pacific Reporter  as the basic ci-
tation form for Colorado, only replacing West’s internal pagina-
tion with paragraph numbers.336
A well-thought-out proposal for an electronic citation system
finally appeared on June 22, 1994, when the Technology Resource
Committee  of the Wisconsin State Bar (Wisconsin TRC) issued a
report on a proposed medium-neutral citation system for Wis-
consin.337 The Wisconsin TRC discarded the disadvantages of the
Sixth Circuit, Louisiana, and Colorado citation formats and in-
stead incorporated the advantages of those formats in one sys-
tem. It kept the year and sequential opinion numbering conven-
tions from the Sixth Circuit format and used the paragraph num-
bering system from the Colorado format. In addition, after the
year in the new format, the Wisconsin TRC added a jurisdiction
identifier—traditionally placed, along with the year, in the paren-
                                                                                                             
332. The Louisiana citation form has an additional flaw as well. By using docket num-
bers instead of the sequential opinion numbers used by the Sixth Circuit, the Louisiana
form necessitates the use of an opinion’s specific date to obviate confusion with a case con-
taining the same docket number. AALL CITATION REPORT, supra note 315, ¶ 64. The use of
docket numbers possesses other disadvantages as well: (1) they have no connection with
whether the case is published; (2) they do not indicate the sequence of publication; (3) they
are frequently too long, creating a greater possibility of error in the citation; and (4) they
frequently do not work well with many electronic case law validation and research tools.
Id.
333. See ABA SPECIAL COMM. ON CITATION ISSUES, REPORT TO THE HOUSE OF
DELEGATES ¶ 33 (1996) [hereinafter ABA CITATION REPORT]; WIS. CITATION REPORT, supra
note 314 at 21; AALL CITATION REPORT, supra note 315, ¶ 37.
334. Star pagination to slip opinion page numbers would require a court clerk to type
in a bracketed page number at the beginning of each page of text.
335. AALL CITATION REPORT, supra note 315, ¶ 51.
336. Id.
337. WIS. CITATION REPORT, supra note 314; see also Marcia J. Koslov, What is the Ci-
tation Proposal?, WIS. LAW., Feb. 1995, at 10.
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thetical at the end of case citations. Pinpoint citations in the pro-
posed Wisconsin format appear as follows:
Smith v. Jones, 1996 Wis App 35, 15.
This simple citation refers the reader to the fifteenth paragraph
of the Wisconsin Court of Appeals’ thirty-fifth decision in 1996.
The Wisconsin proposal was thus the first universal citation
form that recognized the coming primacy of electronic case law
and adapted citation requirements accordingly. The Wisconsin
State Bar Board of Governors approved the new format almost
immediately; after a May 1995 hearing, however, the Wisconsin
Supreme Court postponed consideration of the issue for eighteen
months.338 Nevertheless, the Wisconsin proposal caught on. In
March 1995, the American Association of Law Libraries (AALL)
Task Force on Citation Formats submitted a report to the AALL
Executive Board recommending adoption of the Wisconsin cita-
tion format.339 The entire AALL approved the proposal on July 18,
1995.340 Following the AALL recommendation, the South Dakota
State Bar Association, which had been distributing state court
opinions to its members using the medium-neutral citation for-
mat, began preparing a proposal for the South Dakota Supreme
Court, urging it to adopt the new format.341 At the annual meet-
ing of the American Bar Association in August 1995, the ABA’s
Board of Governors appointed a Special Committee on Citation
Issues to develop recommendations concerning citation systems
and make those recommendations to the ABA’s House of Dele-
gates the following year.342 In October 1995, the Florida Supreme
Court, which had earlier requested comments on a proposal to
eliminate pinpoint citations to West’s Southern Reporter , adopted
a rule which stated that while attorneys should continue to cite to
the Southern Reporter , pinpoint citations, while “preferred,” were
                                                                                                             
338. See John J. Oslund, Wisconsin High Court Delays Decision on Case Citation Plan;
West Publishing Opposes Proposed Change, MINN. STAR-TRIB., May 26, 1995, at 1D. The
Wisconsin Supreme Court did, however, decide to begin posting all of its decisions on court
BBS by September 1995. Id.
339. See AALL CITATION REPORT, supra note 315.
340. Federal Courts: Law Librarians Adopt Resolutions Calling for Alternative Legal
Cites, DAILY REP. FOR EXECUTIVES, July 19, 1995, at D45.
341. Dana Coleman, Other States Battling Over Universal Citations, NEW JERSEY LAW.,
July 31, 1995, at 18. The South Dakota Supreme Court had earlier rebuffed attorneys’ at-
tempts to cite the bar association’s opinions to the court, claiming that it could not find the
cited opinions and reiterating that attorneys had to use West’s North Western Reporter be-
cause it was the state’s official reporter. Id.
342. See Jill Schachner Chanen, In the Matter of Cites, A.B.A. J., Feb. 1996, at 87; see
also ABA Special Committee on Citation Issues, available at http://www.abanet.org/citation/
home.html (Aug. 16, 1996).
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not absolutely necessary.343 In January 1996, the California Su-
preme Court’s Advisory Committee on Publication of Official Re-
ports asked for comments on a proposed “neutral-format” citation
style for state appellate court opinions.344 In May 1996, the ABA
Special Committee released its final report, recommending the
adoption of the Wisconsin proposal as a standard citation system
for all United States jurisdictions.345 The ABA House of Delegates
accepted the Special Committee’s recommendation and endorsed
the proposed system in August 1996.346
B.   Analysis of the New Citation Format
Although driven in part by West’s insistence upon asserting
copyright in the pagination of its case reporters, the move toward
a universal citation system is primarily a response to the vast
changes technology has wrought upon the manner in which legal
information is stored and delivered. A generation ago, legal re-
search meant using print-based case reporters. Computer-
assisted legal research was available to only a handful of top law
firms.347 Since 1990, however, every law student in the United
States has been given a free LEXIS and WESTLAW account.348
After the first semester of law school, during which students are
generally prohibited by their schools from accessing either LEXIS
or WESTLAW, students rarely return to the library stacks con-
                                                                                                             
343. See In re Fla. R. App. P. 9.800(n), Citations, 661 So. 2d 815 (Fla. 1995).
344. Posting of James Evans to law-lib Internet listserv (Jan. 23, 1996) (copy on file
with the author).
345. See ABA CITATION REPORT, supra note 333, ¶ 11. The Special Committee provided
the following examples of the citation form at the federal level:
Supreme Court: 1996 US 15
Court of Appeals: 1996 5Cir 15
District Court: 1996 SDNY 15
Id. ¶ 40, app. A. The AALL proposes a slightly different format for federal district courts
and courts of appeals:
Court of Appeals: 1996 US App (5th) 15
District Court: 1996 US NY (S Dist) 15
AMERICAN ASS’N OF L. LIBR., USER GUIDE TO THE AALL MEDIUM NEUTRAL CITATION Rule
4.2, 4.3 (Draft Release 2.2 1996). The ABA Special Committee also recommended that “all
jurisdictions [should] strongly encourage parallel citation to a print source” during a tran-
sition to “primary reliance on electronic case reports.” ABA CITATION REPORT, supra note
333, ¶ 38.
346. M.A. Stapleton, ABA Backs ‘Instant’ Legal Cite System, CHI. DAILY L. BULL., Aug.
6, 1996, at 1. The vote in the House of Delegates was an overwhelming 336-59. Id. Four
days earlier, the ABA’s Board of Governors unanimously endorsed the new citation form.
M.A. Stapleton, ABA Body Backs Universal System for Legal Cites, CHI. DAILY L. BULL.,
Aug. 2, 1996, at 1.
347. See Harrington, supra note 85, at 553.
348. Marilyn R. Walter, Retaking Control over Teaching Research, 43 J. LEGAL EDUC.
569, 581 (1993).
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taining case reporters; the overwhelming bulk of legal research
that students conduct takes place electronically.349 Moreover, law
schools frequently give their students not only free e-mail ac-
counts, but also free access to the Internet350—where they can
now find a wealth of case law and an assortment of other legal
research resources. The United States has thus reached a point
where its new lawyers are entirely familiar and comfortable with
electronic legal research, and turn to the print medium only as a
last resort.
Further, CD-ROM technology, which allows the entire body of
case law from a given state to be placed on a small disk, has al-
lowed the sole practitioners and small firms that had hitherto
been unable to afford building a library of case reporters in print
an efficient means of accessing the case law in their jurisdictions.
The citation forms developed for use in print reporters are,
however, a product of both nineteenth-century technology and
nineteenth-century ways of thinking. Pages do not naturally exist
in cyberspace. The nearest analogy to other forms of information
dissemination immediately comes to mind when one looks at the
scroll bar that generally resides on the right side of the screen of
most computer applications. Before Gutenberg invented the
printing press—and pages—there were scrolls. Citations to
scrolls took a simple form: the number of the scroll (or chapter or
book) and the paragraph number of the material being cited
within the scroll.351 Instead of being determined by technology, as
pages are, paragraphs indicate what the author intended as a
complete thought.352 Examples of scroll/book/chapter and para-
graph numbers abound, the most obvious being the Bible, e.g.,
Genesis 2:8.353 As the Wisconsin TRC noted, “The proposal of the
Committee is, in no small part, a proposal to use this system. In
several millennia, we have come full circle.”354
                                                                                                             
349. Exceptions occur when students clerk for small law firms or other legal entities
that do not subscribe to WESTLAW or LEXIS. See Carol L. Schlein, Selecting On-Line Re-
search and Discussion Service for Small Firms, NEW JERSEY LAW., May 8, 1995, at 15
(noting that LEXIS and WESTLAW have historically been too expensive for lawyers in
small firms).
350. See, e.g., THE FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY COLLEGE OF LAW, 1995-1996 STUDENT
HANDBOOK 79 (noting that “law students have access to Internet services [and] e-mail”).
351. WIS. CITATION REPORT, supra note 314, at 22.
352. Id. at 28.
353. Id. at 22-23.
354. Id. at 23.
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1.   Criticism of the Proposed Form
a.   A Citation to Nowhere
Criticism of the proposal centers around the observation that
the new citation form does nothing to inform the user where the
material being cited may be found.355 Calling the universal cita-
tion form “incomplete and inefficient,” critics point out that users
are left to guess whether a cited case can be found in a legal
newspaper, a reporter volume, or on the Internet or a CD-ROM.356
Therefore, the argument goes, the new system “makes it much
more difficult to evaluate the reliability of information sources”
because “it is very likely that one will find variant texts between
competing products.”357 Such observations, while undeniably
valid, are hardly novel. For example, in those jurisdictions that
require parallel print citations, the reader is left to wonder which
of the parallel sources the author used.358 Moreover, even if an at-
torney cites to one case reporter, there is no indication whether
the attorney used the actual print volume, a CD-ROM,
WESTLAW, or LEXIS.359 In any event, the issue would seem to
be a minor one at best, for it only comes into play where there are
differing versions of court opinions.360 Furthermore, the definitive
version of a particular case originates on a court BBS, from which
all providers will have obtained the opinion. To create a different
version, a provider would have to actively alter the opinion in
some fashion. Thus, at least in theory, the competitive market-
place should winnow out such unreliable providers of legal infor-
mation.361
b.   Citations to “Any Reliable Source”
West Publishing is quick to point out that it is not opposed to
new citation forms. It prefers a citation rule that is really no rule:
                                                                                                             
355. See, e.g., Donna M. Bergsgaard & Andrew M. Desmond, Keep Government Out of
the Citation Business, JUDICATURE, Sept.-Oct. 1995, at 61; Donna M. Bergsgaard & Wil-
liam H. Lindberg, Case Citation Formats in the United States: Is a Radical New Approach
Needed?, 23 INT’L J. LEGAL INFO. 53, 59 (1995); Berring, supra note 81, at 632.
356. Bergsgaard & Desmond, supra note 355, at 61.
357. Berring, supra note 81, at 632.
358. AALL CITATION REPORT, supra note 315, ¶ 59.
359. Id.
360. Id. As the AALL report indicates, “in actual practice this is not a common
oc[c]urrence and may be easily remedied by obtaining a different version of the case, from
one’s own office, another practitioner, a library, or the court.” Id.
361. Id. It is precisely this form of unreliability that, among other things, led many to
view WESTLAW as inferior to LEXIS in the late 1970s. See Harrington, supra note 85, at
554.
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an “open rule” where courts allow citation to any reliable
source.362 In other words, if a case can only be found on CD-ROM,
the Internet, or in a legal newspaper, courts should allow citation
to any of those specific sources. One West spokesperson has even
suggested that World Wide Web location citations, known as Uni-
form Resource Locators (URLs), may make the proposed citation
form obsolete within a few years.363 Thus, West maintains that
“[i]t is not necessary for courts to require attorneys to cite specific
sources of the law.”364
West’s comments are somewhat disingenuous. West reporters
are undoubtedly the most comprehensive and reliable source of
case law; thus, most attorneys would continue to use West re-
porters even if courts adopted such an “open rule” system. An
“open rule” of citation, however, is the sort of anarchic system
that would be anathema to most courts. Courts promulgate cita-
tion requirements precisely because they do not want to subscribe
to every possible source of case law. Moreover, the universal cita-
tion form leads to a more appropriate version of the “open” cita-
tion rule envisioned by its critics because it allows attorneys to
use “any reliable source” rather than cite to any of those sources.
The proposed citation form requires the use of the citation con-
tained within the opinion itself. The citation will thus be readily
found in all sources. For example, an attorney in Florida might
cite a case found on the Internet as follows:
Smith v. Jones, 1996 Fla 23
A Florida Supreme Court justice, lacking access to the Internet
but possessing a CD-ROM of Florida opinions, could easily find
the opinion simply by locating the twenty-third Florida Supreme
Court opinion from 1996 on the disk.365 Under West’s “open rule”
proposal, the attorney’s citation might look like this:
Smith v. Jones, http://nersp.nerdc.ufl.edu/~lawinfo/flsupct/
cases/feb96/op-86532.html
                                                                                                             
362. Bergsgaard & Desmond, supra note 355, at 63-64; Bergsgaard & Lindberg, supra
note 355, at 63.
363. Bergsgaard & Desmond, supra note 355, at 61.
364. Id.
365. It would be left to CD-ROM publishers how best to locate an opinion on disk. The
easiest system would entail the use of a search engine which would allow the user to input
the citation—much in the same manner as the LEXIS LEXSEE and WESTLAW Find
functions—to call up the case in question.
The same case would be equally easy to find on the Internet. A Web site containing a
particular court’s cases would list opinions sequentially by year. A user accessing the site
would simply click on the sequential opinion number to call up the opinion in question.
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Although perhaps able to garner some helpful information from
the URL, our putative justice would have a much more difficult
time finding the opinion in question without access to the Inter-
net. Moreover, the use of such lengthy citations is not only cum-
bersome, it is also more prone to error.366
Finally, the notion of reliability—or, more precisely, unreliabil-
ity—is often mentioned as an argument against the universal ci-
tation form. Without publishers such as West to edit and clean up
court opinions, those who take opinions with the new citation
format off of Internet databases will simply be getting the “[r]aw
output of the courts.”367 This line of thinking conjures up visions
of hopelessly ungrammatical judges carelessly tossing off mud-
dled opinions that must be filtered through legal publishers to
make sense. Yet the notion that publishers make any significant
changes to final opinions is unfounded.368 As one commentator
has noted, once final opinions are issued, “they do not change
significantly, except in rare cases. Even the publishers confirm
that most of their suggestions are technical, concerning issues
like the form of footnotes.”369 Minor technical changes would have
no impact upon the paragraph numbers in an opinion with a uni-
versal citation. Moreover, the ranks of appellate court clerks—
who frequently either write or edit a judge’s opinion—are gen-
erally filled with notoriously particular former law review editors.
Thus, an overall system of quality control is already in place in
the courts.
c.   Disadvantaging the Print Medium
Critics also contend that the universal citation form puts both
print reporters and their users at a disadvantage.370 In addition to
failing to identify the print reporter in which a cited case might
be found, the citation proposal would entail the use of a citation
translation table for print reporter users, the addition of
                                                                                                             
366. See discussion infra part IV.B.2.
367. Robert C. Berring, Universal Citation Systems—Will Tinkering with the Future Be
the End of Reliable, Standardized Opinions? Yes: Keep Committees Out and Let Market
Forces Work, A.B.A. J., July 1996, at 74. Professor Berring also notes that “[m]aterial
[currently] is gathered, edited, cleaned up, standardized and vetted” by legal publishers.
Id.
368. See Gary Sherman, Universal Citation Systems—Will Tinkering with the Future
Be the End of Reliable, Standardized Opinions? No: Court Bulletin Boards Pose No Threat
to Quality, A.B.A. J., July 1996, at 75 (observing that “judges . . . generally deny that the
print publishers make significant editorial contributions to the final opinion”).
369. Id.
370. See Donna M. Bergsgaard & William H. Lindberg, A Dissenting View, in AALL
CITATION REPORT, supra note 315, at 30-33 (dissenting from majority recommendation).
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“confusing spine labels to volumes that now carry easily under-
stood and easily transcribed volume numbers,” and “significant”
retraining of every attorney who currently knows how to find
cases in print publications.371 Moreover, these critics point out
that while electronic products have become a popular means of
searching for the law, print remains the preferred medium for le-
gal study and analysis.372
The first point—that the appropriate print reporter would be
difficult to locate with the proposed citation system—is not a
fault of the citation form but rather of the print reporter itself.
For if a given legal publisher insists upon continuing the use of
volume numbers that only signify how many volumes of a print
reporter it has published, rather than indicating upon the vol-
ume’s spine which cases from which jurisdiction and which year
are included within the volume, then the publisher should release
a translation table to allow the print user to find a case that uses
the proposed citation form in the publisher’s volume. These solu-
tions, however, become the gist of the critics’ argument that uni-
versal citations would disadvantage print reporters. Neverthe-
less, West provides translation tables today, for translating cita-
tion forms from those jurisdictions with official reporters to
West’s National Reporter System.373 West does not argue that
these official reporters disadvantage users of the National Re-
porter System. However, this does seem to be the very argument
that West is making with respect to universal citations: the pro-
posed form will disadvantage users of the National Reporter Sys-
tem because the reporters in that system group multiple juris-
dictions within a single volume, thus making it difficult (though
not impossible) for West to indicate to the user which cases from
which years are included within a volume. Of course, this is
where the potential for “confusing spine labels” comes in. Yet this
difficulty does not exist where print reporters contain only cases
from one jurisdiction. The solution there is simply to stop assign-
ing volume numbers to such reporters and instead number them
by year, indicating in addition the sequentially numbered cases
contained within the volume. While West’s National Reporter
System was a stroke of marketing genius which made legal re-
search more convenient, its success should not be allowed to
                                                                                                             
371. Id. at 31.
372. Id.
373. AAAL CITATION REPORT, supra note 315, ¶ 58. West’s National Reporter Blue
Book contains translation tables that convert official citations to National Reporter System
citations. Id.
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stand as an obstacle to making legal research even more conven-
ient—not to mention less expensive.
The potential retraining of a nation of attorneys who have
grown accustomed to researching in print reporters is not a par-
ticularly strong argument. The current system of citation is
hardly intuitive, as any first-year law student who is trying to
figure out what “661 So. 2d 288 (Fla. 1995)” means will tell you.
The universal citation form conveys information in a way that
even nonlawyers might understand, for instead of an esoteric ref-
erence to a particular volume number of a publisher’s reporter
series, the proposed form simply indicates the year. Retraining
attorneys to recognize the information conveyed in a much sim-
pler citation system is not an onerous task.374
Finally, it is difficult to argue with the proposition that print
remains the preferred medium in which to read case law. How-
ever, this is not necessarily the same as saying that print report-
ers remain the preferred medium in which to read case law. Many
users of electronic products confess to some difficulty reading
cases from a computer screen.375 Yet it seems unlikely that these
users, once they have found a case electronically, then travel to
the nearest law library and read the case in a reporter. Rather,
users of electronic case law are much more apt to print out the
case file they are viewing on the screen.376 Thus, the universal ci-
tation form cannot be said to disadvantage users who prefer to
read cases in print.
                                                                                                             
374. Indeed, the proposed citation form by and large maintains the jurisdiction
identifiers familiar to attorneys from the parentheticals of the current citation system.
What is perhaps most novel about the new citation form is that it numbers cases se-
quentially by year and uses paragraph numbers instead of page numbers. Although the
use of these two numbers might take attorneys some time to accustom themselves, it
seems difficult to agree with critics who call it a “significant new learning task.” See
id.
375. Id. As Chief Judge Richard A. Posner of the Seventh Circuit says, “The problem is,
us older guys are accustomed to reading on the printed page.” Christine Biederman, Growing
Internet Law Libraries Shake Century-Old Legal Tradition, N.Y. TIMES ON THE WEB, Feb. 16,
1996, available at http://www.nytimes.com/library/cyber/week/0216bluebook.html (Aug. 16,
1996).
376. The author conducted virtually all of the research for this Comment electronically
and printed out those sources he chose to read. Ironically, the only instances that com-
pelled the author to visit a law library occurred when an electronic database did not in-
clude star pagination for a particular journal. This suggests that law journals consider
adopting a medium neutral citation format as well: instead of volume numbers, law jour-
nals would use the year of publication; instead of continuous pagination within a volume
(which might still be retained for the sake of convenience), articles would be numbered se-
quentially; and instead of relying upon page numbers for pinpoint citation, paragraphs
would be numbered.
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d.   Letting the Market Decide
Another line of criticism is perhaps best summed up as being
of the “if-it-ain’t-broke-don’t-fix-it” variety. Taking a page from
the teachings of the law and economics movement, critics of the
citation proposal suggest that the market should dictate legal ci-
tation form.377 The reason current citation practices favor West
reporters is because the market has decided this.378 The market,
the argument goes, will only accept the new citation format when
it is ready.379 Moreover, a universal citation system requirement
is likened to unwanted “Big Government” and “Excessive Regu-
lation.”380 Requiring the new form would, according to this view,
“make the world of citation far more restrictive than it has ever
been in the past.”381
The market did indeed anoint West as the favored resource for
case law. Recognizing this fact, many courts—as well as The
Bluebook—followed suit and, because West reporters were so
readily available, required citations to West volumes. But these
very requirements, together with West’s assertion of copyright in
its reporter pagination, have skewed any “natural” market re-
sponse to new citation forms. Thus, one cannot suggest that the
market dictates citation form because current citation require-
ments prevent it from doing so. If the courts gave up citation re-
quirements to specific sources such as West reporters and
adopted the “open rule” of citation, then perhaps the market
would eventually come to favor a particular citation form. As dis-
cussed earlier, however, courts would be loathe to adopt such a
rule.382 Thus, it is up to the courts—whether seen as “Big Gov-
ernment” involvement or no—to sort out citation requirements
and adapt them to evolving technological needs. The Bluebook
editors have done just that. While the fifteenth edition of The
Bluebook dispensed with the use of parallel citations (except
within individual jurisdictions) and adopted West’s National Re-
porter System as the preferred manner for case citation, the edi-
tors of the sixteenth edition have decided to recommend that
                                                                                                             
377. See, e.g., Berring, supra note 81, at 631 (“Under no circumstances should citation
requirements be changed in a way that would interfere with the natural evolution of legal
information in the marketplace.”).
378. Id. at 633.
379. Id. at 634.
380. See Bergsgaard & Desmond, supra note 355, at 66.
381. Berring, supra note 81, at 631.
382. See discussion supra part IV.B.1.b.
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“when vendor-neutral citations are available, people should use
those vendor-neutral citations as the preferred citation.”383
2.   Theory: Requirements of Legal Citation Form
While legal citation forms serve a number of purposes, the
primary purpose is “to direct the reader to a source of the infor-
mation referred to by the author.”384 In his article Legal Citation
Form: Theory and Practice ,385 Paul Axel-Lute listed 13 principles
of legal citation form: Uniqueness, Brevity, Redundancy, Informa-
tiveness, Dissimilarity among forms , Similarity to original , Logic,
Permanence, Readability/Transcribability , Tradition, Stan-
dardization, Simplicity, and Honesty.386
To satisfy the criterion of Uniqueness, “[a] citation should con-
tain sufficient information to identify unambiguously the mate-
rial cited.”387 The universal citation form easily complies with this
requirement, as it identifies the court issuing the opinion and
assigns a unique identifying number to the opinion. Brevity re-
quires that a citation form “should not be longer than neces-
sary.”388 The new citation form is, in fact, shorter than traditional
citation forms, because it does not include references to a particu-
lar publisher’s volume. Redundancy is a two-pronged criterion,
requiring that the citation form (1) enable one to recover from an
error in the citation, and (2) provide references to different
sources for the same material.389 The current print-based citation
form has fairly strong redundancy in the first sense, as the vol-
ume number and year repeat much the same information.390 The
new citation form lacks this redundancy, but more than makes up
for it in that the citation is part of the opinion itself, thus making
it easier to recover from errors.391 In addition, because of this in-
nateness, the new form is superior in the second sense of redun-
dancy, as it refers readers to all sources of case law, e.g., CD-
ROMs, print reporters, on-line databases, etc.392
                                                                                                             
383. Biederman, supra note 375 (quoting Harvard Law Review president Dave Friedman).
384. Byron D. Cooper, Anglo-American Legal Citation: Historical Development and Li-
brary Implications, 75 LAW LIBR. J. 3, 3 (1982).
385. Paul Axel-Lute, Legal Citation Form: Theory and Practice, 75 LAW LIBR. J. 148 (1982).
386. Id. at 148-49.
387. Id. at 148.
388. Id.
389. Id.
390. WIS. CITATION REPORT, supra note 314, at 33.
391. Id.
392. Id.
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Informativeness  requires that the citation possess “the infor-
mation that is most likely to be useful to the reader in under-
standing and evaluating the authority behind the statement sup-
ported by the citation.”393 Both new and old forms convey equally
the information needed to evaluate the authority of the material
cited. Dissimilarity among forms  requires that citation forms of
material cited in the same context be sufficiently dissimilar to
minimize confusion.394 According to the Wisconsin TRC report,
the four-digit year of the new form provides “a distinctive format
that will prevent confusion with other forms.”395 To satisfy the cri-
terion of Similarity to original  “[a] citation form should be as
close as possible to the full identifying information on the cited
material.”396 The new citation form meets this criterion, as the
cite and the identifying material in the case are one and the
same; such is not the case with the current system. Logic re-
quires that elements of a citation form be arranged to reflect the
logical relationships of the cited material’s attributes.397 Both new
and old forms satisfy this principle equally. Permanence means
precisely that: citation information “should be as permanent as
possible, minimizing the need to revise the citation at a later
time.”398 This criterion is lacking in the current system, as the
means for citing new cases—slip opinions399—eventually changes
to advance sheets and then a permanent reporter.400 Because it is
a part of the opinion, the new citation form is permanent as soon
as the case is released. Readability/Transcribability  refers to a
citation’s “expressib[ility] in different media.”401 Both citation
forms possess this quality equally.
Tradition requires that authority “be cited the way it has been
cited previously, in order to avoid a confusing multiplicity of
forms.”402 Generations of attorneys have used the current system,
while the proposed citation form represents a significant change.
Axel-Lute goes on to say, however, that “[c]itation forms found on
the cited material itself should be followed unless they are defec-
                                                                                                             
393. Axel-Lute, supra note 385, at 148.
394. Id. at 149.
395. WIS. CITATION REPORT, supra note 314, at 33.
396. Axel-Lute, supra note 385, at 149.
397. Id.
398. Id.
399. See The Bluebook: A Uniform System of Citation 67 (15th ed. 1991) (“When a case
is unreported and available only in separately printed slip opinions, give the docket num-
ber, the court, and the full date of the most recent major disposition of the case.”).
400. WIS. CITATION REPORT, supra note 314, at 34.
401. Axel-Lute, supra note 385, at 149.
402. Id.
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tive with respect to other principles.”403 Because the new form will
be found within a cited case, this principle seems to mandate the
use of the new form, traditional citation form notwithstanding.
The Standardization  principle requires that a “writer should fol-
low [The Bluebook:] A Uniform System of Citation .”404 The Blue-
book has made the current system all but uniform across the
country. However, the editors of The Bluebook have indicated
that they will recommend the new citation form be used once it is
adopted as an official method of citation by a given court.405 The
AALL and the ABA have already endorsed the Wisconsin pro-
posal; thus, it would seem likely that it will become the standard
form of vendor-neutral citation.
To satisfy the Simplicity principle, the number of separate
rules to be learned should be kept to a minimum.406 The proposed
citation form is a good deal simpler than the current form, as it
only requires the user to learn jurisdiction designations. Finally,
the Honesty principle requires that “[t]he writer should cite the
source  that was actually used, rather than another source for the
same material.”407 Under the current system, one cites to a publi-
cation containing a copy of the opinion, rather than the opinion
itself. Because one would cite to the opinion itself under the pro-
posed system, one would be citing to the source actually used.
The Axel-Lute principles, published in 1982, do not address
certain conditions that have subsequently arisen, namely the ad-
vent of electronic publication, CD-ROMs, and the Internet, as
well as the controversy surrounding pagination copyright.408 To
address the concerns these conditions engendered, the Wisconsin
TRC report added four additional principles: Precision, Public
Domain, Longevity, and Universality. Precision requires that a ci-
tation “allow the user to easily find the precise material referred
to.”409 The Wisconsin report observes that paragraph citations
provide far greater accuracy than page number citations,
“particularly when the page is in a multi-columned version . . .
and consequently covers a large amount of material.”410 The Pub-
lic Domain principle requires that one should be able to use a ci-
                                                                                                             
403. Id.
404. Id.
405. See Bluebook Editors Moving Toward Recommending Vendor-Neutral Citations,
DAILY REP. FOR EXECUTIVES, Mar. 7, 1996, at A45.
406. Axel-Lute, supra note 385, at 149.
407. Id.
408. AALL CITATION REPORT, supra note 315, ¶ 21.
409. WIS. CITATION REPORT, supra note 314, at 35-36.
410. Id.
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tation system without legal hindrance.411 As the proposed system
is, by definition, vendor-neutral, it is not the property of any one
entity, and may be freely used by all.
To satisfy the Longevity principle, a citation form should be able
to conform to changes in technology over a long period of time.412
The vendor neutral citation form is tied to the author’s thoughts,
expressed as paragraphs, rather than the page numbers, which are
the result of a medium-specific mechanical process that is inde-
pendent of the author. Related to this principle is Universality,
which requires that one be able to use a citation system within a
variety of media and for a variety of purposes.413 The proposed sys-
tem meets this criterion, while the current system does not.
3.   Practice: The Potential Application of the Universal Citation
Form in Florida
Raising the specter of “Big Government” and an overworked
judiciary, criticism of the universal citation system frequently
takes the form of objecting to the costs involved in putting it into
practice. Therefore, exploring the potential application of the
proposed system in a single jurisdiction is helpful. For example,
Florida has a tradition of encouraging unfettered access to public
records.414 Indeed, in addition to the public records statute,415 the
Florida Constitution guarantees access to public records, specifi-
cally including the public records of the judiciary.416 Yet Florida is
also typical of a number of states, in that its court rules require
citation to a reporter in West’s National Reporter System—in this
case, the Southern Reporter .417
a.   Background
As discussed earlier,418 Florida had published its own cases in
volumes known as Florida Reports  until 1948.419 State law in ef-
                                                                                                             
411. Id.
412. Id. at 36.
413. Id.
414. See, e.g., Barbara A. Petersen & Charlie Roberts, Access to Electronic Public Rec-
ords, 22 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 443, 499 (1994) (discussing Florida legislation that requires
record custodians to provide copies of public records in the medium requested if the record
is maintained in that medium); Matthew D. Bunker et al., Access to Government-Held In-
formation in the Computer Age: Applying Legal Doctrine to Emerging Technology, 20 FLA.
ST. U. L. REV. 543, 557-59 (1993) (discussing guidelines to ensure access to computerized
records in Florida).
415. See FLA. STAT. ch. 119 (1995).
416. FLA. CONST. art. I, § 24(a).
417. FLA. R. APP. P. 9.800(a)-(b), (n).
418. See supra text accompanying note 246.
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fect before that time allowed the supreme court to contract with a
“reputable publisher” to print and bind the cases for the state.420
The publisher physically delivered the reporters to the supreme
court, where court personnel would mail them to judges through-
out Florida and also sell them.421 After the Second World War, the
case load had grown too big for the court to physically distribute
its own case reporters; therefore, along with a number of other
jurisdictions, the state decided to rely upon West’s National Re-
porter System.422
Florida is unusual, however, because the court rules requiring
citation to the Southern Reporter  are a reflection of Florida statu-
tory law, which specifies that every two years the state must en-
ter into a contract with West Publishing providing for the publi-
cation of Florida case law.423 Thus, because it enjoys the rare
privilege of being a private company enshrined in the Florida
Statutes, West Publishing would seem to be the official reporter
for Florida.424 Nevertheless, West denies its official status in
Florida425 and has zealously pursued competitors who have tried
to use its page numbers for their compilations of Florida cases.426
Florida therefore has found itself in a rather odd position: it has a
constitution that specifically mandates repeal of any statute or
court rule limiting access to public records,427 yet it keeps a stat-
ute on the books428 requiring its court system to sign agreements
with a publishing company that claims copyright in the versions
of the public records it publishes for the state. Further, the Flor-
ida Supreme Court still requires, via court rule,429 that the only
                                                                                                             
419. Interview with Jo Dowling, Ass’t Librarian, Supreme Court of Florida, in Talla-
hassee, Fla. (Apr. 2, 1996).
420. Id.
421. Id.
422. Id.
423. FLA. STAT. § 25.381 (1995).
424. The Florida Supreme Court has admitted as much. See SUPREME COURT MANUAL,
§ 4, at 700 (“Publishers other than the Court’s official reporter . . . .”); see also supra text
accompanying note 250.
425. Oasis Publishing Co., Inc. v. West Publishing Co., 924 F. Supp. 918, 930 (D. Minn.
1996).
426. See West Publishing Co. v. On Point Solutions, Inc., No. 93-CV-2071-MHS, 1994
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20040 (N.D. Ga. Sept. 1, 1994); see also discussion supra part III.B.
427. FLA. CONST. art. I, § 24(d) provides:
All laws that are in effect on July 1, 1993 that limit public access to records
or meetings shall remain in force, and such laws apply to records of the legis-
lative and judicial branches, until they are repealed. Rules of court that are in
effect on the date of adoption of this section that limit access to records shall
remain in effect until they are repealed.
428. FLA. STAT. § 25.381 (1995).
429. FLA. R. APP. P. 9.800(a)-(b), (n).
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acceptable citation form for case law in Florida is the publisher’s
copyrighted version. Because the copyright claim prevents com-
petitors from offering citable and affordable versions of case law,
the Florida statute and court rule work to hinder access to these
public records.
Therefore, it would seem that Florida would be ripe for adopt-
ing the universal citation form. The Florida Supreme Court, how-
ever, while apparently recognizing the difficulty West’s copyright
claims have created, has simply opted to discard the requirement
of pinpoint citations to the Southern Reporter  rather than adopt
the new citation form.430 This decision, while understandably
cautious considering the rapid changes taking place, was perhaps
too cautious if one understands how easy it would be for Florida
to adopt the new citation form.
b.   The Opinion Dissemination Process in Florida
After a Florida Supreme Court opinion is drafted with word
processing software, it is circulated to the panel that originally
heard the case.431 Depending upon how long the justices’ voting
process takes, the opinion is then ready to be finalized.432 After
being checked one more time for corrections, the opinion—now
called a “file stamp case”—is put in a special directory for West
Publishing on a clerk’s computer.433 From there, the court’s In-
formation System Services (ISS) department transmits opinions
to West every Thursday after 10:00 a.m.434 After all of the opin-
ions have been transmitted to West, ISS takes the opinions and
places them on the court’s BBS.435 From there, LEXIS retrieves
its copies of opinions, as does the official supreme court opinion
Web site at the University of Florida College of Law.436 Court
data from 1993 indicates that the court disseminated “roughly”
428 opinions with dispositions that year.437
                                                                                                             
430. In re Fla. R. App. P. 9.800(n), Citations, 661 So. 2d 815, 816 (Fla. 1995):
“[P]inpoint citation to . . . the Southern Reporter . . . is optional, although preferred.” As
noted earlier, few attorneys practicing before the Florida Supreme Court would venture to
disregard its “preferences.” See supra note 272.
431. Interview with Janie Bentley, Deputy Clerk, Supreme Court of Florida, in Talla-
hassee, Fla. (Apr. 2, 1996).
 432. Id.
433. Id.
434. Id.
435. Id.
436. Id.
437. Id.
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c.   Implementing the New Citation Form
The obvious time to append the universal citation form to the
Florida Supreme Court’s opinions is when they are checked for
corrections a final time, immediately prior to their becoming a
“file-stamp case” ready for distribution. Court personnel checking
the opinion could easily assign sequential case numbers at this
point, because it is from here that the opinions are released for
distribution; thus, the assigned numbers would accurately reflect
the sequence in which the court releases its opinions. This re-
quires no more work than the clerk checking the last sequential
case number issued and typing, e.g., “1996 Fla 23” at the top of
the document.
Assigning paragraph numbers at this stage would seem desir-
able as well. Software currently exists that completely automates
the assignment of paragraph numbers with a minimum of
checking required.438 Indeed, macros within currently used word
processing software can automatically assign paragraph numbers
to opinions.439 The Wisconsin TRC report recommends that para-
graph numbers start at the line containing the author’s name,
while the AALL report proposes that paragraph numbers begin
with the first paragraph of the opinion.440 Both reports agree that
indented quotations and footnotes should remain unnumbered.441
Implementing the universal citation in Florida would thus be a
simple task that requires minimal additional effort on the part of
existing court personnel. Of greater concern is the disposition of
the court’s electronic opinions. Currently, ISS deletes opinions
from the court’s BBS within two weeks after placing them
there.442 While the opinions are being archived prospectively on
the official court opinion Web site, they are only readily accessible
as Web pages, not as the original source files.443 While Rich Text
Format (RTF) versions of the original source files are available
for downloading, they are only formally accessible as individual
files at the end of each case’s web page.444 The court should seri-
                                                                                                             
438. AALL CITATION REPORT, supra note 315, ¶ 72.
439. WIS. CITATION REPORT, supra note 314, at 28.
440. Id. at 30; AALL CITATION REPORT, supra note 315, ¶ 67.
441. WIS. CITATION REPORT, supra note 314, at 28; AALL CITATION REPORT, supra note
315, ¶ 67. A footnote would be considered a part of the paragraph in which it appears,
while an indented quotation would be considered a part of the paragraph immediately pre-
ceding it. WIS. CITATION REPORT, supra note 314, at 28.
442. Bentley, supra note 431.
443. See Supreme Court of Florida Opinions, available at http://nersp.nerdc.ufl.edu/
~lawinfo/flsupct/index.html (Aug. 16, 1996).
444. See id.
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ously consider replacing its Internet-inaccessible BBS with a file
transfer protocol (ftp)445 Internet site where the files are kept
permanently. Indeed, since 1990, the U.S. Supreme Court has
been archiving its opinions through its Project Hermes at an ftp
site at Case Western Reserve University.446 The opinions are
available both in a plain text format as well as in the Court’s
original Word Perfect word processing format.447 When combined
with the universal citation form, a similar system in Florida
would allow anyone who is interested to download opinions and
compile them on CD-ROM, Web sites, or even in print reporters.
The market would then reward those who add the most value to
the data with headnotes, syllabi, or search engines at the lowest
cost. Most important, the site would serve as the authoritative lo-
cation for Florida case law.448 Just as users of current citations
know to look to the Southern Reporter  for the authoritative ver-
sions of Florida opinions today, the users of the universal citation
system would know to look to the court’s electronic archive449 for
the authoritative versions of Florida opinions tomorrow.
                                                                                                             
445. Ftp allows a user “to list the names of computer files available on a remote com-
puter, and to transfer one or more of those files to an individual's local computer.” Ameri-
can Civil Liberties Union v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824, 835 (E.D. Pa. 1996).
446. See Robert J. Ambrogi, Finding Court Decisions on the Internet, RES GESTAE,
June 1995, at 44.
447. Id.
448. This is hardly a significant investment in financial terms. The average Florida
Supreme Court opinion for the month of February 1996 was approximately nine kilobytes
in length. See Index of /~lawinfo/flsupct/cases/feb96, available at http://nersp.nerdc.ufl.edu/
~lawinfo/flsupct/cases/feb96/ (Aug. 16, 1996). Assuming a caseload of no more than 500
cases per year, see supra note 437 and accompanying text, a year’s worth of Florida Su-
preme Court opinions would take up 4.5 megabytes of space. A moderately well-equipped
personal computer costs approximately $2,000 today and contains over one gigabyte—a
thousand megabytes—of storage space. See Elisa Williams, It’s Time to Buy a Computer,
ORANGE COUNTY REGISTER, May 5, 1996, at K7. Thus, an average personal computer con-
tains enough space for 222 years of Florida Supreme Court opinions.
The biggest investment would be in providing a system with wide bandwidth Internet
access to meet the demands of users. The purchase of server hardware, software, and a di-
rect connection to the Internet runs “anywhere from $10,000 to $35,000 and up, depending
on the power of the computer system and the speed of the connection.” Eric Richardson,
Site Construction, INTERNET WORLD, Apr. 1996, at 62, 64. The cost of a 1.54 megabyte-per-
second T1 connection ranges from $1,300 to $2,000 a month. Id. at 66. Thus, after the ini-
tial investment in setting up the ftp server, the yearly cost (excluding that of an individual
to oversee the system) would be between $15,600 and $24,000—insignificant in terms of
state budgetary appropriations.
449. These users would presumably also be aware of conveniently designed Web sites
or CD-ROMs containing copies of all opinions in the archive.
CD-ROM users, who now generally have to wait for periodic updates to their collections
of case law on CD-ROM, will quite likely be able to instantly update their CD-ROM case
law libraries via supplements on the World Wide Web. See Robert E. Calem, Hybrid CD-
ROMs Send Users to the Web, N.Y. TIMES ON THE WEB, Apr. 18, 1996, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/library/cyber/week/0419interactive.html (Aug. 16, 1996); Robert
E. Calem, CD-ROM Publishers Seek Salvation in On-Line Links, N.Y. TIMES ON THE WEB,
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V.   CONCLUSION
[T]he Law . . . should be accessible to every man and at all
times.450
Franz Kafka
Courts in this country have two jobs: to say “what the law is”
and to disseminate those sayings to the citizenry.451 Those say-
ings on what the law is should be made available to the bench,
bar, and public at little or no cost. The dissemination of this in-
formation should not be limited via either copyright law or ex-
clusive contracts. Nevertheless, this is currently the state of case
law dissemination in the United States, even though such a pol-
icy is at odds with both 150 years of court precedent and at least
one state constitution.
However, the ascendance of new information technologies, in
particular the Internet and CD-ROMs, is having a radical effect
upon the way information is disseminated. Court opinions are
quickly finding their way onto both the Internet as well as the
CD-ROMs of small publishers who have neither copyright claims
nor contractual agreements with particular jurisdictions. Current
court rules of citation lag far behind this technological revolution,
generally permitting citation only to the print reporters of a pri-
vate legal publisher that asserts copyright in the page numbers of
those volumes. While this claim seems spurious in the light of the
Supreme Court’s decision in Feist, it nonetheless continues to re-
strict the sound public policy of maximum access to the law by
both discouraging competitors from entering the legal publishing
market and keeping the price of access artificially high.
The print medium, however, is no longer the primary means
via which the legal researcher accesses court opinions. Recogniz-
ing this fact, several organizations have proposed a new citation
form that is independent of both vendor and medium formats.
The implementation of the new format requires little or nothing
in the way of extra court resources. Indeed, its success would be
assured if each jurisdiction began maintaining its own authorita-
tive electronic databases of court opinions. Therefore, the judici-
ary should move immediately to adopt a uniform system of cita-
                                                                                                             
Apr. 17, 1996, available at http://www.nytimes.com/library/cyber/week/0418interactive.html
(Aug. 16, 1996).
450. KAFKA, supra note 1, at 213.
451. The judiciary is the third branch of the government, and “governments have a
duty to disseminate government information to their citizens.” AALL CITATION REPORT,
supra note 315, ¶ 14.
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tion that denominates opinions by the year and sequential order
of release, and that provides for precise location markers within
each opinion via the use of paragraph numbers.
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APPENDIX
   U.S. COURTS OF APPEALS ON THE WORLD WIDE WEB  (AUG. 1996)
Court World Wide Web URL
Date of
Earliest
Opinion
D.C. Cir. http://www.ll.georgetown.edu/Fed-Ct/cadc.html Mar. 95
1st Cir. http://www.law.emory.edu/1circuit Nov. 95
2d Cir. http://www.law.pace.edu/legal/us-legal/judiciary/second-circuit.html Sep. 95
3d Cir. http://www.law.vill.edu/Fed-Ct/ca03.html May 94
4th Cir. http://www.law.emory.edu/4circuit Jan. 95
5th Cir. http://www.law.utexas.edu/us5th/us5th.html Nov. 92
6th Cir. http://www.law.emory.edu/6circuit Jan. 95
7th Cir. http://www.law.emory.edu/7circuit Aug. 95
8th Cir. http://www.wulaw.wustl.edu/8th.cir/ Oct. 95
9th Cir. http://www.law.vill.edu/Fed-Ct/ca09.html June 95
10th Cir. http://www.law.emory.edu/10circuit Aug. 95
11th Cir. http://www.law.emory.edu/11circuit Nov. 94
Fed. Cir. http://www.ll.georgetown.edu/Fed-Ct/cafed.html Aug. 95
    STATE SUPREME COURTS ON THE WORLD WIDE WEB (AUG. 1996)
Court World Wide Web URL
Date of
Earliest
Opinion
Alaska† http://www.touchngo.com/sp/sp.htm Jan. 91
Ark.† http://www.state.ar.us/supremecourt/opinions/sc1996.htm Jan. 96
Florida http://nersp.nerdc.ufl.edu/~lawinfo/flsupct/index.html Sep. 95
Idaho† http://www.state.id.us/judicial/scopins.html Dec. 95
Indiana† http://www.law.indiana.edu/law/incourts/incourts.html Jan. 95
Mass.† http://www.lweekly.com/wm/lw/page/lw/sjc Apr. 96
Michigan http://www.umich.edu/~icle/misupct/index.htm Oct. 95
Minn.† http://www.courts.state.mn.us/opinions/sc/current/sccur.html May 96
Miss.† http://www.mslawyer.com/mssc/case.html Feb. 96
Missouri http://www.state.mo.us/sca/mosupct.htm Feb. 95
N.H. http://www.state.nh.us/courts/supreme/opinions.htm Nov. 95
N.Y. http://www.law.cornell.edu:80/ny/ctap/overview.html Jan. 92
N.C.† http://www.aoc.state.nc.us/www/courts/appeals/sc/contents.html Dec. 95
Ohio http://www.sconet.ohio.gov/ May 92
Tenn.† http://www.tsc.state.tn.us/opinions/tsc/oplsttsc.htm Aug. 95
Vermont gopher://dol.state.vt.us:70/11GOPHER_ROOT3%3A%5BSUPCT%5D Aug. 91
Wash.† http://www.wa.gov/courts/opinpage/home.htm Mar. 96
Wis.† http://www.wisbar.org/Wis/index.html Oct. 95
Wyo. http://courts.state.wy.us/opinion.htm Jan. 96
                                                                                                             
† State court of appeals opinions are also available from the same Web site.
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